Municipal Surpluses Are Not That Unexpected

  

The news that the City of Thunder Bay has an “unexpected” operating surplus for 2025 has been greeted with a mixture of commentary including some remarks that it should be spent on crumbing roads or perhaps a tax break.  Apparently much of the additional revenue came from the liquidation of an investment portfolio and as is standard policy, will be added to the reserves.  None of this is really a surprise because if one looks back on past budget years, often, there is an operating surplus or what is referred to as positive variance. 

 

Figure 1 plots City of Thunder Bay operating surpluses from 2012 to 2025 and two-thirds of the time the city has had an operating surplus.  Indeed, the accumulated operating surpluses since 2012 sum to about 17 million dollars.  However, this is not the end of the story because this is only the operating surplus.  The City of Thunder Bay has both a capital and an operating budget and over the 2009 to 2024 period (2025 for Thunder Bay is not available yet on FIR), the total surplus (the difference between total revenues and total expenditures) was only in deficit twice as illustrated in Figure 2.  Indeed, the accumulated total surplus since 2009 has been 376.1 million dollars.

 

This is not a Thunder Bay thing. Across Canada, municipalities are not separate tiers of government but essentially wards or creatures of the province. Provinces keep a tight rein over municipalities and their finances ensuring that they generally run surpluses and that those surpluses go into reserves.  As Figure 3 illustrates, periods of deficit in the national local government sector have been few with only the four years from 2000 to 2003 showing a deficit.  So, Thunder Bay is not exceptional in generating repeated surpluses – it is something that is the norm.  The greater concern would be municipalities running perpetual deficits but that is something generally indulged in by the federal and provincial governments.  By comparison, municipalities are paragons of fiscal rectitude.

 

The Finances of the University: Lakehead 2026 Edition

  

Universities in Ontario have been feeling somewhat more upbeat this year in the wake of provincial government measures to bolster the sector. After years of essentially starving the sector with a tuition cut and freeze as well as a continued freeze in operating grant funding, 2026 saw the announcement of combined measures totalling nearly $6.4 billion (at least according to the government’s accounting) to make the sector more sustainable.  Not least of which was a move to finally allow universities to once again begin increasing tuition rates on domestic students by up to 2 percent a year.  While this will likely not make up the revenue drop from the decline in international students, it is also being accompanied by increases in base funding to the system.

The government finally moved on the university sector funding issue because quite frankly the sector was at the end of its rope. However, even with the new funding which has pulled the sector back from the “abyss”  it remains that in the end it is not so much a rebuild as a halt to deepening the financial pit. Even with the funding, universities remain in austerity mode and with many continuing in deficit mode, they will still be making cuts.  And all this will be in the face of what is anticipated to be rising demand and a projection that nearly one million additional university educated workers will be needed in Ontario between 2026 and 2035. This is not a surprise given that since 2018, Ontario has added nearly two million people largely through immigration and immigrants being younger on average than the general population have children who will be seeking education. On top of this, a massive retirement boom is coming meaning numerous vacancies will need to be filled.

Through all this flux and financial challenge, some universities have managed to do better than expected this year financially and while one always expects University of Toronto to do relatively well and balance its budget, Lakehead is also expecting to balance its budget for the 2026/27 fiscal year.  Lakehead appears to be holding its own quite well in attracting targeted government funding for new initiatives whether they be a STEM Campus in Barrie or a new veterinary school, on top of the coming increases in both government base finding as well as higher tuition fees on domestic students.  Lakehead indeed was fortunate in not being as dependent on international undergraduates for its international student enrolment as some other universities. 

This comes on top of a relatively strong long-term financial performance because of its gradual transformation away from being a university for northwestern Ontario to a regional multi-campus Ontario university.  Indeed, Lakehead with its three campuses of Thunder Bay, Orillia and Barrie in one university has become the holy trinity of universities.  The Barrie campus will bring special financial blessings as it is in the center of a compact CMA population of 250,000 meaning that ultimately its enrolment may even eclipse that of the Thunder Bay campus.  This will all build on a rather successful tradition of prudent long-term financial management and soundness as documented below. The data for the subsequent charts come from historical Institutional Statistics Books accumulated for the 2000 to 2011 period (eg. Institutional Statistics Book 2001/02) as well as annual university financial statements.

Figure 1 plots revenues, expenditures and deficits annually from 2000 to 2025.  From revenues and expenditures of just under $80 million annually in 2000, by 2025, Lakehead’s revenues had grown to $246 million and expenditures to $231 million. In 2025, Lakehead ran a surplus of $15.4 million which followed 2024 with a surplus of $7.6 million.  Indeed, Lakehead has usually managed to run surpluses with deficits being incurred in only 6 of the last 26 fiscal years with an accumulated surplus since 2000 of $89.7 million. 

 

 

The biggest deficit was of course pandemic induced in 2021-22 but surpluses have grown every year since. As a result, long term debt has gradually been whittled down as Figure 2 illustrates.  There was a surge in university long-term debt during the 2000 to 2006 period as the Orillia expansion was started and new buildings such as the ATAC constructed on campus.  Long-term debt peaked in 2012 at $115 million and by 2025 had declined to $94 billion.  

 

 

The major revenue drivers during this period have been the duo of government operating grants and student tuition revenue as illustrated in Figure 3.  However, government operating grants were essentially flat between 2012 and 2024 at just over $60 million but then surged from $61 million in 2024 to $69.5 million in 2025. They have nevertheless declined from a peak of 41 percent of university revenues in 2012 to 28 percent in 2025.  Meanwhile, tuition revenues, reflecting the rise in international students, have grown quite steadily both as a share of revenues as well as in total.  Indeed, in 2025, at $102 million, tuition fees accounted for 42 percent of Lakehead University total revenues.  Other revenues aside from operating grants and tuition which together account for 70 percent of university revenues include income from investments, ancillary fees and revenues (e.g., Parking) and restricted government grants and funds.

 

 

Of course, the reason we are all here at Lakehead is because of the students and no exposition of university finances would be complete without looking at the trends in enrollment. Figure 4 plots total enrollment at Lakehead (headcount of both full and part time students) from 2001 to 2025.  There was rapid growth from 2001 to 2011 that saw enrolment rise by about 40 percent.  Enrollment then levelled off for nearly a decade but has begun to grow since 2022 and now sits at a headcount of just over 9,000 spread out as it is across three campuses.  It remains that over this period there has been a decline in the share of Thunder Bay campus undergraduate enrollment which has been made up by graduate enrollment across all the campuses and undergraduate enrolment in Orillia in particular. 

 

 

In the end, the university has managed to grow its enrolment in a particularly challenging demographic environment given until recently stagnant population growth in the region. Part of its financial management has also involved restraining costs.  In this regard, Lakehead has been assisted by two factors.  First, the total full time faculty complement has remained relatively stable since 2010 while enrolment has risen reflecting more intensive human resource use.  In that year, there were just over 300 full time faculty appointments at Lakehead and in 2025, there were also just over 300 full time faculty appointments.  While the number of full-time faculty has remained essentially fixed since 2010, total headcount enrollment has grown nearly 14 percent and as a result the average student headcount to full time faculty ratio grown from approximately 25 per faculty member to 31. 

Second, there was the impact of Ontario’s Bill C-124 which was brought in in 2019 capping salary increases at 1 percent in the broader public sector and was in effect until 2024.  Low salary growth rates combined with stable faculty numbers is an effective cost management tool and the fruit is borne out by the charts provided here.  Lakehead has managed to grow its revenues faster than costs over a sustained long-term period that has seen balanced budgets or surpluses in three quarters of the fiscal years since 2000.  It has also expanded its infrastructure to encompass three campuses to recruit more students while at the same time gradually reducing its long-term debt from a pronounced peak.   In a tough and competitive environment, Lakehead has managed to thrive, and its financial state is a success story that should be celebrated.

Finances of the City: Hamilton Edition

 

Municipal budget season is underway in cities across Ontario.  Hamilton is a particularly interesting case this year given that the initial start of the 2026 budget season saw an 8.9 percent potential property tax increase presented. Hamilton’s Mayor Horwath has waded into the debate with directions to staff to hold the tax increase to 4.25 percent by finding operational efficiencies that do not involve staff cuts.  However, according to one report, nearly half of the 2026 operating budget increase is being driven by employee costs with the City of Hamilton’s head count up 12 percent since 2022 and now stands at 9,449. 

Getting a grasp on Hamilton’s current municipal finances requires more of a historical perspective.  So, what do Hamilton’s finances look like and how have they evolved? Well, that is a good question and an attempt to provide a long-term perspective on Hamilton’s municipal finances is in order. Data for Hamilton is available for 2000 to 2022 from Ontario’s Ministry of Municipal Affairs Financial Information Return. Hamilton – like quite a few other municipalities – appears to have fallen behind in filing their financial reports with the provincial government so 2023 to 2025 must rely on Hamilton municipal budgets. 

However, these budgets present financial information in a dizzying and confusing array that overwhelm the reader with detail that make the big picture difficult to see.  They are also not standardized in presentation and vary greatly in length with Budget 2023 clocking in at 51 pages, Budget 2024 at 365 pages and Budget 2025 at 434 pages.  Trying to make sense of them can be a slog even for an economist and if there is anything the provincial government should do, it is to speed up the reporting of financial information on FIR so the public can maintain a consistent grasp of the numbers when it comes to municipal finance across Ontario.

Figures 1 to 5 provide a limited overview of some of Hamilton’s key long-term municipal finance indicators.  Figure 1 plots total operating expenditure and total tax revenues for the 2000 to 2025 period.  Total tax revenue grew from $486 million in 2000 to $1244 million while total operating expenditures went from $985 million to $2,163 million.  There is of course no cause for alarm regarding the gap because tax revenues only fund a portion of operating expenditures with the rest coming from provincial and federal grants, user and licensing fees, investment income, etc.…However, as Figure 2 illustrates, the share of total expenditure accounted for by property tax revenues has grown over time with the linear trend showing an increase from an average of about 45 percent to nearly 55 percent – growth of nearly 10 percentage points.  Essentially, municipal ratepayers in Hamilton have been bearing a larger share of municipal operating expenditure over time with average tax revenue per household nearly doubling since 2000 going from $2,544 to $4,863.

 

 

Figures 3 and 4 plot the annual growth rates of total tax revenue as well as total operating expenditure and fits trend lines to the data as well as provide the average growth rate for each series over the 2001 to 2025 period. Both tax revenues and total expenditures exhibit rising growth rates from 2001 to about 2010 and then a decline in the wake of the 2008/09 economic slowdown and then an uptick in growth rates after 2019 to the present.  Over the entire 200 to 2025 period, tax revenues have grown at an average annual rate of 3.8 percent while total operating expenditures have grown at 3.3 percent.  This differential growth has been driven by the rising reliance on taxes over slower growing grants and other revenue sources.

 

 

Finally, Figure 5 looks at the evolution of the municipal headcount as well as the wage and salary cost per employee.  While the recent increases in head count may seem alarming, it turns out that the current numbers have been  higher in the past particularly in the wake of the 2001 amalgamation.  The period from 2005 to 2022 has been relatively stable in terms of municipal employment going from lows of approximately 7,300 to highs of about 8,200.  The period since 2017 has seen steady growth with employment rising from 7,502 to 9,449 at present – an increase of 26 percent.  Since 2017, the number of households in Hamilton has only grown about 12 percent while population has grown nine percent.  As well, between 2000 and 2025, the wage and salary cost (benefits not included) per municipal employee has grown from approximately $36,000 annually to nearly $113,000 in 2025 – essentially a tripling of the cost per employee.  It should be noted that while the average annual rate of increase of wages and salaries per employee in Hamilton form 2001 to 2025 was 4.9 percent, the average CPI inflation rate for Ontario over the same period was 2.3 percent.

 

 

Pulling everything together, it appears that the fiscal challenges affecting the City of Hamilton this year have been brewing for some time.  Tax revenues have been growing as a share of total operating expenditure due to slower growth of other sources of revenue.  While the average annual growth rate of total tax revenues since 2001 has averaged 3.8 percent, since 2021, the percent increases have ranged from 4.5 to 8.1 percent.  Tax revenues have been growing faster than the growth of total operating expenditure but increases in wage and salary costs per employee in particular have been rising faster than tax revenue growth, total operating expenditures, as well as the CPI inflation rate.  Whereas in 2000, employee wage and salary costs accounted for 34 percent of operating expenditures, by 2025 they accounted for nearly 50 percent. Indeed, since 2017, the average wage and salary per employee has been over $100,000 and this does not consider the costs of pensions and other benefits.

While Hamilton is not unique in facing municipal fiscal challenges, the increases of the last four years have been particularly large making this year's budget exercise especially challenging.

 

The Finances of the University: Lakehead’s Exceptional Performance

 

With all the doom and gloom about the finances of Canadian universities these days, it is refreshing to know that some universities have been doing well in coping with all the fiscal challenges thrown at them over the last decade.  Nowhere is this more the case than in Ontario where domestic tuition fees were cut 10 percent in 2018 by the province, and have remained frozen since, provincial government grants have generally been a declining source of revenue and the flow of international students curtailed by the federal government. While Ontario produced Laurentian, it has also produced Lakehead where the last decade has seen a better financial performance than one might have expected which is good news for Thunder Bay, northwestern Ontario and of course the students, staff and faculty at Lakehead.

The evidence is quite convincing.  Figure 1 (and subsequent figures) takes data from the audited financial statements of Lakehead University from 2014 to 2025 and plots total revenues and expenditures.  Between 2014 and 2025, Lakehead’s total revenues grew from $177.3 million to $246.0 million - 38.7 percent – while total expenditures grew from $167.0 million to $230.5 million – a 38 percent increase.  While the pandemic period from 2020 to 2022 saw a dip in revenue growth, since 2022, revenues have managed to grow faster than spending. Indeed, over the period 2015 to 2025, the average annual growth rate of revenues was 3.3 percent compared to 3.0 percent for expenditures.  

 

 

The result has been a decade where the budget has usually been balanced, sometimes with substantial surpluses, and the long-term debt been reduced.  Figure 2 plots Lakehead University’s deficits (-)/surpluses (+) as well as the total long-term debt again from 2014 to 2025.  Out of these 12 budget years, Lakehead ran a surplus 75 percent of the time with an accumulated surplus of $43.9 million while the long-term debt has decreased nearly 16 percent going from $111.5 million in 2014 to $94.0 million in 2025.  The worse deficit year was 2022 with a deficit of $16.7 million in the wake of the pandemic but the three years since has seen growing surpluses with 2025 at $13.5 million.

 

 

Drilling down into some of the data, Figure 3 presents the data for Lakehead’s major revenue sources – provincial government grants and student fees.  In 2025, these sources made up 82 percent of Lakehead’s revenue with the remainder a combination including investment income, research income, ancillary fees, and sales of goods and services.  The narrative regarding provincial government grants should be nuanced by the fact that there are the general operating grants and then more specific restricted grants tied to conditions.  In 2014, the value of the operating grant was $65.3 million, and it then proceeded to decline through to 2019 when it reached $62.9 million.  Note that this decline preceded the arrival of the Ford government in 2018 showing that in the end universities in Ontario do not have any tried-and-true political party friends at the provincial level. Grants then rebounded in 2020 declining to a low of $61.6 million in 2022. Since 2022, the operating grant has been somewhat erratic rising to $66.7 million in 2023, falling to $61.0 million in 2024 and then climbing again to $69.5 million in 2025.  Stable funding it is not.  As for restricted grants, they climbed in fits and starts going from $15 million in 2014 to almost $17 million by 2021 and then rising more steeply to 30.5 million in 2025. 

 

 

While total provincial grants to Lakehead grew 25 percent from 2014 to 2025, the real revenue story is in student fees which rose from $57.5 million to $102.4 million – an increase of 78 percent.  This is even though overall enrolment has grown but not in leaps and bounds.  The revenue increase is largely the result of a compositional shift as more higher tuition paying international students arrived at the university.  Given that many of these students are primarily graduate level and in disciplines that are in demand, it appears the immigration restrictions have not hit Lakehead’s enrolment as hard as some other universities.  This suggests a careful mix of programs tailored to demand.

So, to summarize, Figure 4 presents the average annual growth rates of these major indicators for the 2015 to 2025 period.  Total revenue at Lakehead has grown at an average annual rate of 3.3 percent while expenditures have grown 3 percent.  This in and of itself presents a picture of fiscal sustainability rooted on both the expenditure and revenue side.  While general operating grants have only grown at an average annual rate of 0.7 percent, restricted grants (targeted to some purpose) have grown 8.7 percent annually and student fee revenue has grown 5.5 percent.  And the icing on the cake is that long-term debt has been declining at -1.5 percent annually. 

 

This is extremely good news and evidence that even in today’s challenging university environment, it is possible to succeed both financially and academically as a university offering programs in a fiscally sustainable manner.  Lakehead has managed this operating as it does in a dispersed fashion with campuses in Thunder Bay, Orillia and Barrie making it a province wide university.  This success may indeed serve as a model for future of Ontario’s universities. This success is also a testament to the strength of its board and administrative leadership as well as its students, staff and faculty.  It is nice to have some good news for a change.

Federal Finances in Review

 

The last week has been a chaotic one in Ottawa given the resignation of the finance minister on the eve of the Federal Economic and Fiscal Statement (FES), the turmoil over the Prime Minister’s leadership and the ongoing verbal assaults of President-elect Trump on Canadian sovereignty.  Nonetheless, lost in all of this is that after a considerable delay, there has finally been an update to Canada’s Fiscal Reference Tables (FRT) and Figures 1-4 here provide an overview of both the past (1966-67 to 2023-24) as laid out in the FRT and the future (2024-25 to 2028-29) such as it is laid out in the FES. 

Figure 1 provides a nice snapshot of the federal fiscal footprint – the federal spending to GDP ratio. Over the period of this chart, the federal footprint reached a  maximum of 25.6 percent in 2020-21 during the pandemic. This was of a course an outlier year and if one takes this out, one nevertheless notices that from a low of 13.9 percent in 2013-14, the federal fiscal footprint has gradually drifted upwards notwithstanding the pandemic and in 2022-24 stood at 17 percent.  While not at the level of the 1980s when it exceeded 20 percent, it remains that the federal fiscal footprint both in 2023-24 and going forward to 2028-29 is the largest it has been since the late 1990s and marks a calculated expansion of federal public sector size relative to GDP.

 

 Part of this rising expenditure has been financed via borrowing and in 2023-24 the deficit stood at nearly $62 billion.  From 2023-24 to 2028-29, Canada is forecast to accumulate another $242 billion dollars in deficits bringing the national net debt to $1.549 trillion by 2028-29. Figure 2 plots the deficit to GDP ratio, and it stands at nearly 2 percent for 2023-24 and is forecast to drop to 0.7 percent by 2028-29 – assuming of course that given the deficits projected, nominal GDP growth proceeds at 4 percent annually.  Given the slowdown in the economy that appears to be underway and the likely imposition of US tariffs in 2025, this would appear to be an exceptionally rosy GDP growth forecast.

 

 Figure 3 plots the net debt to GDP ratio, and it began to take a definite upward path starting in 2019-20 when it went to 37 percent from 33 percent the year previous.  It peaked at just over 44 percent in 2022-23 and is only going to come down slowly to about 42 percent by 2028-29.  Now, while up by recent standards, it is nowhere near where it was during the federal fiscal crisis of the 1990s.  Yet, the debt is mounting, and interest rates are higher than they were during the debt and spending spiral of the pandemic and so debt service costs have gone up.

 

 In 2019-20, debt service costs were $24.4 billion representing about 7 percent of federal revenues that year.  For 2024-25 they are anticipated to be more than double at $53.7 billion or 10.8 percent of federal revenues.   By 2028-29, it is projected that annual debt service costs will reach $66.3 billion or 11.3 percent of federal revenues.  As Figure 4 illustrates, we are again nowhere near the numbers of the federal fiscal crisis when well over 30 percent of federal revenues went to service the debt. At the same time, we appear to have settled at a plateau over 10 percent for the foreseeable future and that is money better spent on programs.

 

 In her resignation letter, the outgoing finance minister appeared to have a fiscal epiphany as she noted the need to keep our fiscal powder dry to face the economic challenges coming down the pipeline.  The trends of the last few years suggest that there has been a certain dampness to federal fiscal powder for the last few years that is expected to persist into the future.  While there is still fiscal room to manoeuvre, a large recessionary shock will quickly erode that room given the gradual enrichment of long-term  federal spending via assorted initiatives over the last decade as illustrated by the federal expenditure to GDP ratio. This suggests that dealing with a major recession will be more challenging that it would have been a decade ago.

 

 

Getting Ready for Budget Season: A look at Thunder Bay Municipal Indicators

 

Municipal budget season is well underway in Thunder Bay, but the main public theatrics over the 2025 budget should be transpiring over the next few months.  The most recent indication is that City Council is expected to target a 3.8 percent municipal tax levy increase.  There are budget pressures underway not the least of which is apparently an additional $5.6 million to cover wages and benefits. Putting budgets into context is always more useful if a long term is taken and fortunately the Ontario government does provide resources to track municipal spending.  Here, a useful tool are the multi-year financial reports provided from the Financial Information Returns which provide standardized reporting of a municipality’s financial activities as well as additional statistical information.

 

Figure 1 presents municipal property taxes per household and water and sewer charges per household since 2000.  While many other municipalities appear to have filed their 2023 returns, Thunder Bay appears to be lagging and therefore this long-term snapshot only goes to 2022.  From 2000 to 2022, municipal property taxes in Thunder Bay have nearly doubled going from $1,947 to $3,918.  The growth of water and sewer charges has been more pronounced going from $379 per household in 2000 to $1,158 in 2022 – a tripling of the average per household charge.

 

 

 

Figure 2 plots a dual scale chart with the total municipal workforce (full time, part time and seasonal) on the right size axis and the value of wages, salaries, and benefits per employee on the left axis.  Perhaps one of the reasons Thunder Bay is lagging in putting out its financial information is that it is a bit short staffed given that the total size of the municipal workforce has declined from a peak reached circa 2013 and has been pretty flat since 2016.  On the other hand, since 2000, the size of the municipal workforce has gone from 2,344 employees (there is a data  gap in 2003) to 3,404 in 2022 – an increase of 45 percent.  Over the same period, average wages, salaries and benefits per employee have grown from $46,978 to $83,799 – an increase of 78 percent.

 

 

 

However, these indicators and the increases over time are best placed in context to an assortment of other indicators and this is done in Figure 3 which plots the percent increase in an assortment of indicators from 2000 to 2022.  As one can see, prices in Thunder Bay as measured by CPI inflation have risen by 49 percent.  Own purpose property tax revenues (the total tax levy) has grown 122 percent while total grants revenues have only grown by 55 percent.  Municipal property taxes per household have grown 101 percent while water and sewer charges have grown 205 percent.  

 

 

 

Meanwhile the total taxable assessment has grown by 60 percent which when divided by the number of years works out to an annual average growth of 2.7 percent.  This seems at odds with the fact that published reports have been of average assessment growth over the last ten years of only 0.6 percent annually.  However, one suspects that the 0.6 percent is real growth – after inflation – because the average annual assessment growth of 2.7 percent minus the average annual inflation rate of 2.2 percent from 2000 to 2022 yields real average annual assessment growth of 0.5 percent.  Given that property prices have grown substantially in Thunder Bay over the last decade in particular, the nominal rather than inflation adjusted tax assessment has been growing in tandem

 

More interesting is the fact that between 2000 and 2022, the population of the City of Thunder Bay has actually decreased by 6 percent.  This also seems at odds with recent reports that Thunder Bay is over 130,000 people but it must be remembered that FIR deals with municipal finances and the population of the City of Thunder Bay is that within its city limits while the recent population reports are for the larger Census Metropolitan Area.  Essentially, growth in Thunder Bay has been occurring outside the city limits where they do not have to pay property taxes to the City of Thunder Bay.

 

And finally to round things off, the municipal workforce over the 2000 to 2022 period grew by 45 percent, the total compensation per employee grew 78 percent and the total value of building permits grew 85 percent.  However, after inflation of 49 percent, salaries and benefits per employee only grew in real terms by 29 percent while to end things,  the real total value of permits grew by 36 percent. 

Can Ontario's Universities Be Made Sustainable? Part 2 - Solutions?

Last post, we surveyed the financial situation of Ontario universities and the evidence suggests that the “system” as a whole is sustainable given that total revenues generally exceeded total expenditures.  However, that did not mean that there was not a sustainability issue given that as many as a dozen institutions were expected to run deficits going into the 2024-25 academic year.   It would appear that some institutions are more sustainable than others and that smaller and more remote institutions in particular faced financial issues of which the Laurentian situation was the grimmest recent example.  However, even larger and more research-intensive universities are not immune from financial issues as illustrated by the recent example of Queen’s University.

 

What are the solutions? The measures needed are either to reduce expenses, raise revenues or some combination thereof.  With respect to revenue, you will have to assume the total provincial grant package is not going to change beyond what the government has promised.  On the revenue side, there is enrollment revenue, and you can either raise price or quantity sold when it comes to students.  Demographics suggest that domestic enrollment is finally starting to rise but international enrollment is not in the wake of federal measures and given domestic tuition is still frozen it means tuition revenues cannot be expected to be a big driver of sustainability.  Moreover, much of the potential domestic enrollment increase over the next decade or so is going to be in the GTA which is of limited value to more remote regional universities.

 

 

Other revenue solutions?  Fundraising?  Ancillary revenues? Sales of goods and services?  Research services?  These already are being used and their growth potential depends on the local market.  In the case of ancillary revenues like parking, food services or even residence fees, these took a large hit during the pandemic and have yet to recover.  Students and even faculty and staff are no longer as likely or willing to be a captive market on campus.  While there is still a desire for in-person course learning, many university students like the flexibility of online or hybrid options and these options naturally do not come with parking sticker revenues or food purchases in campus eateries. Fund raising to build endowments?  These take a long time, and the reality is that donors like to contribute to goals with a tangible outcome – a building, a program, a scholarship – and not to a fund that will generate revenues for general operating expenses.  Indeed, some donations by creating new programs or positions or a building will contribute to operating expenses in the long term even if they generate short term resources.

 

Which brings us to the cost side.  One simple solution is simply a draconian government mandated across the board pay cuts to all university employees (there probably is a way to do if they put their mind to it).  In 2022, salaries and benefits for Ontario universities were $10.5 billion out of total expenses of $17.2 billion – 61 percent.  Academic salaries were only $4.8 billion or 28 percent of total expenses.  If only 28 percent of total university expenses are academic salaries (46 percent of total salaries and benefits) – it does beg the question as to what all the other money is going to.  Nevertheless, in theory, hundreds of millions of dollars can be saved by cutting salaries and benefits 5 or 10 percent – in the short term.  However, a system wide cut is a blunt instrument and as noted some institutions are just fine without it.  Moreover, an across the board cut - aside from the obvious political turmoil it would cause – does not address the structural issues of universities perhaps having the wrong mix of programs for their markets or even too many programs given their regional demand.  A wage cut without addressing the structure of spending only postpones the sustainability problem to another day.  And a wage cut to universities alone raises the more uncomfortable question about the wages and salaries for the rest of the broader public sector.  If you think universities pay well, then take a look at municipalities and the health and education sectors.

 

Another cost side solution is a university-by-university approach tailoring government initiatives and responses to the unique issues of each institution.  Maybe some institutions should be closed outright but every community with a university would fight (one hopes) to retain their university.   Are there cost savings in universities working together to save on procurement of supplies or services?  Can automation and AI streamline and reduce costs when it comes to management of students, human resource functions, recruitment, enrolment management?  And of course, can one save money by more intensive use of current human resources?  On the staff and faculty side we can term this as more “efficiency” or doing more with the same resources.  On the faculty side, this inevitably means larger classes or more classes – an increase in class size and teaching loads.  Of course, this may reduce program offerings and that leads to less diversity in both courses and programs.  On the other hand, does every university need the same set of programs and departments? 

 

All of these revenue and cost measures just outlined are not new ideas.  They have been around for some time and ultimately involve nudging the trajectory of expenses and revenues to ensure a more sustainable path.  They do not solve the fundamental problem outlined which is that Ontario has a set of universities which its government and public really do not want to pay more for.  Ontario funds its universities and regards it as a system but in reality, it is a set of semi-autonomous but highly regulated institutions, each with its own funding situation – some of which are sustainable and some which are not based on their debt and deficit positions - and filled with processes that lead to slow decision making given the independence of staff and faculty in particular. Nudging them does not seem to work very quickly if at all.

 

Another solution?  A complete overhaul of Ontario’s university system (I am not going to deal with community colleges but to some extent the same solutions can apply to them) that involves merging a number of the smaller institutions (along with more financially troubled larger ones if necessary) into an actual regional university system with individual campuses offering less diversified and more specialized offerings. This may be a way out given the politics of every major urban area in Ontario wanting a university but unrealistically expecting a full range of courses and programs that cannot be sustained given regional enrollment bases.

 

What might such a reform look like for any government willing to bite the bullet and incur the wrath of assorted regional electorates?  Well, the more sustainable larger research-intensive universities would likely remain pretty much as they currently are.  We all know who they are but at minimum would include University of Toronto, Western, Waterloo, McMaster, perhaps Queen’s and perhaps either Ottawa U or Carleton or maybe both.    Some might add Guelph to this list or even York.  As for the remaining universities – some of which are rather large – one could create three university systems: The University of Southern Ontario (Windsor, perhaps Guelph, Laurier, York, Universite de’Ontario francais, Brock), The University of Eastern Ontario (TMU, Trent, Ontario Tech, OCAD) and A University of Northern Ontario (Algoma, Lakehead, Laurentian, Nipissing, NOSM, Hearst). 

 

Of course, simply merging these various institutions into one a system only makes sense if it is accompanied by program and administrative rationalization.  For example, a University of Northern Ontario would not need six economics or six biology or six engineering departments or as many department chairs or eventually as many faculty and staff for that matter. There would also be a marked decline in the demand for Deans, Vice-Presidents, Associate Vice-Presdients and Presidents and assorted entourages.   The same would go for a University of Southern Ontario or Eastern Ontario.   Students would need to go to the campus where their specific program is being offered for their in-person courses or take them online.  This would be a major restructuring of courses and offerings as well as how they are offered.  Indeed, this rationalization via specialization of both administrations, faculty and staff in specific campuses linked by modern information and digital technology is where some savings might be.  Simply merging universities, keeping all the programs intact and creating a new administrative apparatus with dominion over them all is not going to save any money.  It will simply spend more.  The goal is to reduce the expenditure side well below the current revenue side to provide more resources overall for the system.  This outcome also requires government not take the savings and spend them on something else. 

 

Is a merged campuses solution just a pig’s breakfast of acrimony and political chaos?  Yes indeed.  Could it work? Perhaps with the right set of skilled decision makers but let’s face it, this is 21^st century Canada – skilled decision makers seem to be in short supply and outnumbered by word salad spewing political performers masquerading as the former.  And then, why have three systems?  Maybe those three systems that have been proposed could simply be combined into one – The University of Ontario alongside the remaining half dozen or so stand-alone universities.   Each University of Ontario campus would remain on the footprint of the current university but with fewer programs and faculties and of course fewer administrators and staff.  In some communities, you might even merge them with the local community college.  Sure, there would be a lot of unhappy campers, but it would be the system that Ontarians are willing to pay for.   If they don’t like it or if there are not enough places for everyone, they would be welcome to send their kids elsewhere – perhaps to another province or maybe an American liberal arts college? 

 

Trying to change the Ontario university system to deal with long-term sustainability is a task that most governments are not up for.   Most likely, the tendency will be to do nothing and let the system meander into yet another crisis down the road.  This is the most likely path forward given that not only do Ontarians not want to pay more for universities, but they do also not wish to think about them unless their children have trouble getting into a desired program or a residence spot.  In the absence of more public support for universities, another solution is to simply deregulate university tuition and let universities set their own fee schedules to attract and retain students based on what they see as their market and strengths.  It remains that the tuition currently being paid by domestic students is less than half what it actually costs to educate them.  The price is too low because it is subsidized by government.  More tuition competition in the end would result in universities eventually making their own cost-side restructuring decisions given that what they offer would need to be more tailored to price. Such an approach would also need to be accompanied by an enhanced provincial student aid program to deal with lower income accessibility to university (and college) education. 

 

 

 

 

However, again, none of this is new.  All of these ideas have been around for a long time but always come up against the political culture of the province and the culture of universities.  When it comes to universities, Ontarians want guaranteed access to a premium university system that provides a wide range of courses and programs but at discount prices.  The government likes to create universities but does not like to fund them.  Good luck with that.

 This post originally appeared on the Fraser Institute Blog, March 25th, 2024.

Ontario government’s fiscal history drenched in red ink

— March 25, 2024

The Ford government will table its next budget on Tuesday. But a longer-term perspective on the evolution of Ontario’s government finances provides some important context for today. Since Confederation, Ontario has seen a massive expansion of its revenues, expenditures and debt. And its fiscal performance in terms of balancing its finances has oscillated over the years. Using data from the Finances of the Nation database, assorted Ontario budgets, and the Fiscal Reference Tables, a picture of change and variable fiscal responsibility emerges.

With revenues of $2.3 million and expenditures of $1.2 million in 1868, Ontario had a substantial surplus and no debt. Indeed, substantial surpluses marked much of the pre-Second World War era. By 2023, the Ontario government had spending of $199 billion and revenues of $193 billion for a deficit of nearly $6 billion and a net debt of $400 billion. Ontario government spending on a real per-capita basis was relatively modest from 1867 to 1913 (despite province-building activities such as roads and railroads) and was financed primarily by federal government grants and natural resource revenues from forestry and mining. The period after 1914 saw an expansion of both government spending and revenues that was quite dramatic compared to the prior period, but which paled in comparison with the post-1957 expansion into health, education and social services.

With respect to revenue composition, Ontario gradually shifted from a reliance on natural resource rents and government grants to own-source revenues from income, consumption and other assorted taxes. When compared to the federal government—the only other Canadian government larger than Ontario in terms of total revenues or expenditure—in real per-capita terms Ontario spent less than the federal government until the early 1990s surpassing the Ottawa in 1993 for the first time. By 2020, real per-capita Ontario government spending was actually more than federal real per-capita spending, though the pandemic years saw a reversal.

What’s truly remarkable about Ontario’s finances is its growing reliance on deficit financing since the 1970s. Over the entire 1867 to 2023 period, Ontario ran an operating deficit in 70 out of 157 years or approximately 45 per cent of the time. However, in the first 100 years from Confederation (1867 to 1967) Ontario only ran 22 deficits—that’s 22 per cent of the time. In the fiscal years from 1968 to 2023, Ontario ran 48 deficits in 55 years—or deficits 87 per cent of the time. Deficits have gone from being a temporary departure for exceptional times to a near permanent device.

The accompanying charts plot Ontario’s deficits, its deficit-to-GDP ratio, its net debt and its net debt-to-GDP ratio from 1960 to the present. The first chart illustrates that Ontario maintained its largely balanced budget approach to its finances for most of the 1960s but incurred deficits in the 1970s.

Its three largest deficits were in 2010 ($19.3 billion), 2011 ($17.3 billion) and 2021 ($16.4 billion). As a share of GDP, the second chart illustrates that Ontario’s three largest deficits were in 1992 (3.7 per cent), 1993 (4.1 per cent) and 1994 (3.5 per cent). Ontario’s pandemic deficit peak in 2021 came in at 1.7 per cent placing it lower than some of the deficits of the 1970s and early 1980s.

Deficits plus interest eventually result in accumulated debt and Ontario like other provinces has added to that by borrowing for capital spending on top of its operating deficit. As the final chart shows, in 1960 Ontario had a net debt of $994 million and net debt-to-GDP ratio of 6 per cent. Today, net debt tops $400 billion and the net debt-to-GDP ratio is about 36 per cent. The profiles for net debt and net debt-to-GDP suggest Ontario’s net debt has grown in three phases.

The accumulation of net debt takes off in the mid 1970s, then accelerates in the 1990s and accelerates yet again after 2008. These periods of acceleration have all coincided with periods of economic slowdown or recession in the province—the low growth stagflation era of the 1970s, the recession of the early 1990s and recession/financial crisis era of 2007 to 2009. In each of these periods of distress, deficits mounted, yet even when the economy and revenues began to recover, spending growth and deficits continued. In essence, the Ontario government ran deficits during bad times and better times, giving a fiscal dimension to the provincial motto “Loyal She Remains.”

As Ontario moves forward from the pandemic era, it remains to be seen if the government will rein in perpetual deficit financing and halt debt accumulation, or if the government will embark on yet another cycle of mounting debt. In many respects, the government has continued to spend at a rate well above its economic ability and performance. Key to the issue is Ontario’s productivity lag, which has resulted in slow growth relative to the rest of the country. If the Ford government continues to spend as if Ontario was still experiencing the high growth rates of an earlier era, that’s not a sound recipe for fiscal responsibility.

What the Federal Economic Statement Did Not Highlight

 

Well, the Federal Fall Economic Statement for 2023 is out and soon to be relegated to the collections of fiscal and economic history.  There is a lot out there summarizing the economic and fiscal situation facing the federal government. Briefly, for 2023-24 it looks like revenues of $456 billion and expenditures of $489 billion for a deficit before actuarial losses of $32.5 billion and a deficit with actuarial losses of $40 billion.  Inflation this year will be about 3.8 percent and next year the outlook is for 2.5 percent while real GDP growth in 2023 is now forecast to end up at a lower 1.1 percent and for next year at a paltry 0.4 percent.  On the bright side, there are measures to create more housing, but they add up to perhaps 300,000 homes by 2031 which given the country apparently needs 3.5 million means the housing shortage is going to be around for some time to come. 

 

Two things the numbers on the fall statement do not highlight.  First, when one factors in population growth going forward at about 2.5 percent annually and the government's inflation and GDP growth forecasts, real per capita GDP is going to continue declining over the next five years.  As Figure 1 shows, by 2028, inflation adjusted output per person by 2028 will be lower than it was in 2014.  Given the anemic business investment in Canada and the resulting weak productivity performance of the Canadian economy and its inability to grow faster than population, falling real GDP per person means a declining standard of living.  We are looking at essentially a lost decade or more if nothing happens to ramp up growth.

 

 

 

Second, a fiscal anchor or guardrail set as a deficit to GDP ratio of 1 percent means that there will be perpetual deficits for years to come of at least 30 billion dollars.  Put more starkly as Figure 2 illustrates, federal revenues and expenditures will continue to grow in tandem like ships traveling alongside in the night but never actually meeting.  This will result by 2028 in a net federal debt of almost $1.5 trillion and debt service costs of about $60 billion annually which as a share of federal revenue will account for about 10 percent of revenue.

 

 

 

Needless to say, it is not surprising that these types of projections are not front and centre from the perspective of a government facing slowing growth and rising spending.