Northern Economist 2.0

Monday 18 March 2024

What is a Provincial Government to Do?

 

Ontario is coming up to Budget Day next week on March 26th and it will be interesting to see what the provincial government does on a number of issues because quite frankly the provincial government is in a bit of a pickle when it comes to economic and fiscal policyOver the last decade, Ontario has been hit by a productivity decline that has translated into slower economic growth.  Since the pandemic, this has been combined with a bout of inflation and a surge in population growth.  When you start looking at Ontario fiscal and economic indicators in real per capita terms, there are going forward disturbing implications for our standard of living.

 

If one compares the 2023-24 fiscal year forecast from the Fall Economic Update with the 2018-19 fiscal year, total provincial government revenues and expenditures are up approximately 30 percent respectively.  Health expenditure is up 33 percent.  The size of the provincial economy is up 22 percent.  On the surface, this is seemingly good news in the wake of the pandemic.  The problem is that over the same period, population in Ontario has grown by an estimated 12 percent while prices have risen nearly 19 percent.  Put another way, the combination of population and inflation at nearly 30 percent has outstripped nominal GDP growth while essentially matching the growth of government revenues and expenditures and in particular health spending.

 

The best way to visually illustrate these effects is to create an index.  Figure 1 uses data from Statistics Canada, the Fiscal Reference Tables and the 2023 Ontario Fall Economic Outlook and Fiscal Review to create real per person indices of economic and fiscal performance setting 2013/14 as 100.  Figure 1 plots real per capita (deflated using the CPI-All Items Index) Ontario provincial government Own Source Revenue, Federal Transfers, Total Revenue, Program Expenditure, Debt Service Costs and Total Expenditures.  Note that 2023-24 is an estimate.

 


 

 

In real per capita terms, debt service costs have been a bright spot in that despite the continuing rise in both the provincial net debt and interest rates, inflation and population growth have served to reduce the real per capita burden of servicing Ontario’s debt.  Indeed, the drop-in debt service has probably been able to free up resources for program spending. On the other hand, compared to 2018/19, real per capita revenues and expenditures are now below where they were.  In other words, provincial government revenue and spending have not kept up with inflation and more importantly population growth.

 

 


 

Figure 2 illustrates the decline in the Ontario way of life a bit more succinctly.  Does the health care system feel strained?  Real per capita provincial government health care spending after the surge of the pandemic is back to where it was in 2018/19.  Indeed, it has not changed much since 2013/14.  During that time, one imagines that labor costs for health care have gone up pretty dramatically which means there are indeed fewer doctors and nurses available to service a growing population. And to top it all off, real per capita output in Ontario has not kept pace with either inflation or population growth.  While real per capita GDP in Ontario grew somewhat from 2013/14 to the pandemic, it has since declined.

 

Looking at Figure 2, if the average Ontario had to ask themselves am I better off than a decade ago when it comes to my real per capita income and health spending, the answer is one that should concern the provincial government.

Sunday 25 February 2024

Ontario's Housing Woes-a supply side problem

 This post originally appeared on the Fraser Institute Blog, February 24th, 2024.

Ontario’s housing woes—a supply-side problem

Ontario’s housing woes—a supply-side problem

Housing prices in Ontario, like in much of the rest of Canada, have soared because of several factors including supply constraints combined with rising demand fuelled by robust population growth. The most recent installment in this ongoing saga is the federal government’s move to cap international student visas to which Ontario has announced measures requiring universities and colleges to guarantee student housing—though how this is to be done is a good question.

These short term reactive regulatory actions at both the federal and provincial level will ultimately do little to solve the problem of scarce and expensive housing because they do not address the root of the problem—the supply side, particularly the high cost of building new homes, which results in meagre efforts to build new housing stock.

Aside from the recent labour shortages and run-up in construction costs in the pandemic’s wake, there are two additional facets to the supply and cost-side issues of housing in Canada in general and Ontario in particular.

First, there’s the role of government in driving up the cost of new housing through regulatory actions at the provincial and municipal level. Housing in early 21st century Ontario has been treated not as an investment but as a source of cash for governments, which always seem to need more money. According to a CMHC report, government charges on new housing development via warranty fees, municipal fees, development and permit fees easily add 20 per cent to the cost of building a new home. Indeed, the regulatory charges for a new home in a place such as Markham can easily add up to $180,000 with some of the higher costs imposed on higher density row homes and high rise units relative to single-detached homes. This is not an inconsequential amount given housing prices in Markham average about $1.3 million.

Second, housing supply has not kept up with population growth. This is not a new story—the addition of new per-person housing stock in Ontario peaked in the 1970s. The chart below plots total housing starts for Ontario from 1955 to 2023. While there have been cyclic highs and lows, the overall trend has been upwards. Even so, the total number of starts peaked in 1973 at 110,536 starts. By way of contrast, 2023 saw 89,297 new home starts. In 1973, Ontario’s population was 8.1 million people whereas by 2023 it was estimated at 15.8 million.

Fig. 1

When one calculates the number of new starts per person and constructs an index with 1955 equal to 100, it becomes clear that new housing starts per person have been on a long-term decline. Compared to 1955, we’re building 45 per cent fewer new homes per person. If you compare it to the per-person peak in the 1970s, Ontario in 2023 built nearly 60 per cent fewer new homes per person.

Fig. 2

To add to the stock of affordable housing, the Ontario government has set the target of 1.5 million homes to be built by 2031. To this end, it created a Building Faster Fund that would provide up to $1.2 billion to municipalities that meet or exceed the government housing target set for that community and provide strong mayoral powers to municipalities to help cut through municipal red tape and speed up construction. The government has also set housing targets for municipalities to meet to receive the funding.

Keep in mind that to reach a target of 1.5 million new homes by 2031, Ontario would need to add 187,500 new homes a year until 2031. As the first chart illustrates, since 1955 there has not been a single year where Ontario has come close to that number. Indeed, if one compares housing starts as a per cent of the target set by the provincial government across municipalities based on data from its Housing Tracker (see chart below) it’s clear that as of late-January 2024, barely one-quarter of municipalities had met their 2023 housing target. Not the most auspicious start.

Fig. 3

What’s Ontario to do? The province’s housing availability and affordability problem will likely get worse before it gets better. Along with boosting the supply of skilled trades people to help construct more homes, it must reduce the regulatory and zoning barriers that slow down the construction of multi-unit residential projects, reduce the governmental development charges particularly on “missing-middle” density builds that emphasize family-sized units, and provide further tax incentives geared to building high-rise multi-unit builds with family-sized units. Governments should also increase efforts to leverage surplus public lands at the federal, provincial and municipal levels to help construct affordable housing as the current approach has paid little attention to having a constant and ample supply of shovel-ready sites.

Only such a multi-pronged approach will have any hope of meeting the housing needs of Ontarians over time.

Monday 12 February 2024

Municipal Spending Evolution in Thunder Bay

 

As the 2024 municipal budget season wraps up, it is worth looking at where Thunder Bay has been going over the last decade in terms of the composition of its total municipal expenditures (all spending, tax and grant supported, capital and operating).  Using multi-year financial data (2002 to 2022) from the Ontario Ministry of Municipal Affairs Financial Information Review, one can obtain an overview of the trends.  In 2012, total municipal expenditures in Thunder Bay were 505.4 million dollars and in 2022 they were 599.8 million making for an increase of 19 percent.  Compared to some other municipalities, this was actually a rather modest increase as over the same period, Greater-Sudbury saw an increase of 41 percent, Windsor 26 percent, Barrie 29 percent and Kingston 41 percent.  At the same time, over this entire period, Thunder Bay nevertheless still managed to have the largest municipal expenditure to GDP ratio of these cities.  

 

What is more interesting is the evolution in functional composition.  Figure 1 illustrates that in 2012, the City of Thunder Bay spent 5 percent of its budget on general government, 14 percent on protection of persons and property, 12 percent on transportation, 12 percent on the environment, 5 percent on health and emergency services, 13 percent on social and family services, 9 percent on cultural and recreation services, 2 percent on planning and development and 28 percent on "other".  This last category reflects Thunder Bay’s ownership of its municipal telecom utility (TBayTel) as well as differences in the way Thunder Bay approaches social housing given we have a district board – the District of Thunder Bay Social Services Administration Board.

 

 


 

Figure 2 presents the 2022 composition.  General government showed a decline to 4 percent, protection to persons and property rose to 21 percent, transportation remained at 12 percent as did the environment.  Meanwhile, health and emergency services grew to 7 percent, social and family services declined to 7 percent, and both recreation and culture and planning and development remained the same at 9 percent and 2 percent respectively.  Meanwhile, the "other" category's share declined to 26 percent.  

 

 


 

Of course, for the composition to change, it means that these categories have grown at different rates and so Figure 3 presents the percent change in total spending by category over the 2012 to 2022 period.  In accord with general local perceptions, the largest increases in spending have indeed been in protection services and health and emergency services at 76 and 73 percent respectively.  Next is recreation and culture at 25 percent, followed by the environment at 14 percent, planning and development at 13 percent, "other" at 12 percent and transportation at 11 percent.  There were two categories that saw declines in total spending: general government fell by 6 percent (there have indeed been some administrative economies) while social and family services fell by 32 percent.  

 

 


 

Given that social issues have been front and center in Thunder Bay over the last few years, this allocation does provide some insight into how Thunder Bay is dealing with some of its social issues.  Resource allocation appears to have targeted the more direct outcomes and fallout of the assorted social ills afflicting the streets of Thunder Bay.  This is to be expected.  What is somewhat more disturbing is that there has been an expenditure drop in family and social services which one might expect would be a longer-term spending approach to addressing some of the causes of social issues.  Whereas, in 2012, 64.4 million was being spent on family and social services, this has declined to 44 million by 2022.  

 

It is interesting to note that of the five cities mentioned at the start of this post, between 2012 and 2022, Thunder Bay saw the largest percent increases in dollars spent on protection to persons and property as well as health and emergency services.  With respect to spending on family and social services, only Barrie saw a decline while Greater-Sudbury, Windsor and Kingston all saw increases.  Windsor, Barrie, Greater-Sudbury, and Kingston also all  increases in social housing spending (though Greater-Sudbury's was quite small). However,  in the case of Thunder Bay it is difficult to tell from these numbers if we are indeed spending more in social housing in the "other" category.  Ultimately, such differences across urban centers will provide an interesting laboratory experiment on how municipalities are dealing with issues like poverty, addiction and crime.

Friday 2 February 2024

Ontario Economic Decline is Real and Substantial

 This post originally appeared in the Fraser Institute Blog.

A spectre is stalking Ontario, and it’s the spectre of decline. For most of post-war Canadian economic history, Ontario has had a per-capita real GDP substantially above the Canadian average. At the same time, Ontario has had real per-capita GDP growth relatively close to the Canadian average.

This dominance was rooted in Ontario’s role as Canada’s industrial heartland that developed in the wake of Confederation. Ontario was indeed a beneficiary of Canada’s national economic development policies based on development of the Canadian prairie wheat economy, a tariff wall to protect domestic manufacturing and an east-west railway transport corridor. At the same time, Ontario’s economy was also marked by prosperity driven by market-based economic development best described in the words of economic historian Ian Drummond as “progress without planning.”

Ontario’s performance can be summarized in two charts using data from the Macro-data Base of Finances of the Nation. The first chart below plots real per-capita GDP separately for Ontario versus the rest of the country (Canada without Ontario) from 1990 to 2022.


 

The second chart plots the average annual growth rate for Ontario, the rest of the country and all of Canada for the 1990 to 2022 period and the approximately 30-year period preceding it. The evidence suggests that during the 1990s, Ontario fell dramatically below the rest of the country in terms of its real per-capita GDP growth. In 2006, the rest of the country surpassed Ontario’s real per-capita GDP and remained higher for a decade before converging from about 2015 to the pandemic era. However, in the immediate post-pandemic era, Ontario has once again fallen behind the rest of the country.

 


 

During the 30-year period prior to 1990, Ontario’s real GDP per-capita growth was quite close to the overall Canadian average and that of Canada without Ontario. What’s remarkable is what’s happened since.

Ontario’s average annual growth rate of real per-capita GDP fell from 2.6 per cent to 0.6 per cent. To be fair, a productivity decline has also marked the rest of the country. Indeed, Ontario and the rest of Canada appear locked as partners in a long-term productivity and growth decline, but Ontario’s performance is both dire and unique. The rest of Canada since 1990 saw its per-capita income growth rate cut in half. While hardly a sterling performance, compared to Ontario it was a veritable boom given that Ontario’s post-1990 average annual growth rate was barely one-quarter that of its 1960 to 1990 growth rate. One can argue that Ontario is dragging down the overall Canadian growth rate.

One can construct all kinds of palatable and soothing stories to explain why this has happened and why it’s not as unflattering as these statistics suggest. For example, one can argue that convergence of income is a good thing as it provides for a more economically balanced federation and is a logical outcome of economic development spreading across the country. At the same time, convergence could also mean that once per-capita incomes have equalized, growth rates should be similar, too, which is not the case here.

One could argue that Ontario was exceptionally hard hit by the economic adjustment its manufacturing base underwent during the 1990s in the wake of the 1998 Canada-U.S. Free Trade agreement and then NAFTA. Yet most of that adjustment was done in the 1990s and a breakdown of growth rates in the 1990 to 2022 period shows 1990 to 2000 had higher per-capita income growth than afterwards. One could also argue that the real per-capita slowdown is an illusion fuelled by rapid population growth. This of course ignores the reality that Ontario’s population has been growing about the same as the rest of the country and its share of total Canadian population today remains pretty much the same as 30 years ago.

Another potential argument is that the relatively better performance of the rest of the country is the result of natural resources with Alberta, Saskatchewan and Newfoundland and Labrador doing much of the heavy lifting. Yet this ignores that Ontario, and especially its north, is resource rich with abundant minerals and hydropower resources. Yet Ontario has been planning for more than two decades to access its Ring of Fire and little yet emerged. If the early 20th century could be characterized as “Progress without planning” then the early 21st may as well be “Planning without progress.”

Finally, one could argue it’s all just a rough patch for Ontario and that things are about to turn around. At the 1960 to 1990 growth rate, Ontario’s per-capita income would double in about 30 years. At the post-1990 average annual growth rate, the next doubling will take more than a century.

These are all ultimately unconvincing stories strung together to provide a comforting and bearable account as to why we shouldn’t worry and indeed shouldn’t do anything at all. Yet the first step to a solution is acknowledging a problem exists. Unfortunately, Ontario seems serene in the confidence it does not have to worry. Ontario needs to wake up and realize it has a problem.

 



Monday 8 January 2024

The Perils of Northwestern Ontario Roads

 

The holiday season has seen a spate of accidents on the highways of northwestern Ontario - seven between December 29th and January 6th according to stories reported on TBnewswatch.  This has resulted in a number of deaths and highway closures as well as an outage of service for TbayTel with numerous customers losing phone, internet and television service.  Indeed, since mid-December at least five people have been killed in highway collisions in the region across ten major accidents. Indeed, according to a CBC report, 34 people were killed on northwestern Ontario roads in 2022.  This has made road safety a major issue and it has been exacerbated by what appear to be an increasing number of collisions involving transport trucks. Collisions involving transport trucks on area highways appear to have grown from 13.4 percent of the total in 2016 to 21.3 percent in 2021.

 

Of course, whether or not it is more dangerous to drive in northwestern Ontario relative to the rest of the province invariably requires not absolute numbers, but relative comparisons based on rates of fatalities that are population adjusted.  For example, using data from  Ontario Road Safety Annual Reports,  in 2022, Ontario as a whole had  592 fatalities on its roads while northwestern Ontario had 34. However, while northwestern Ontario accounts for 1.5 percent of Ontario’s population, it accounted for over 6 percent of its persons killed in collisions in 2022 based on these numbers.

 

The trend is even more stark if one plots these road deaths per 100,000 population constructed from data available since 2015 from the Safety Reports combined with population data for Ontario and the northwest.  It should be noted that the 2021 and 2022 reports are still preliminary and therefore do not include the official regional numbers.  While there are numbers for Ontario as a whole for those two years, the rate per 100,000 was also estimated using population figures for those years.  Thus, 2021 and 2022 for northwestern Ontario and Ontario are “estimates” based on Ontario population, the reported total by CBC for 2022 and a calculation for 2021 done based on the average from 2015 to 2022 of northwestern Ontario to Ontario fatalities.

 


 

 

The results show that when done per 100,000 population there are substantially more deaths on northwestern Ontario roadways than Ontario as a whole.  From 2015 to 2022, average fatalities per 100,000 population were 8.7 for the northwest while for Ontario as a whole they were 4.0.  In other words, the roadways of the northwest are twice as deadly compared to the Ontario average.  And, while Ontario appears stable over this time period, one could argue that the northwest is seeing an overall upward trend.  Is this a problem? I would think so.  The roads of the northwest – in particular its highways - are not just regional roads but national conduits for travel and commerce.  This is a provincial problem with local and national implications given the number of lives being lost.  Drivers beware.

Friday 3 November 2023

Ontario’s 2023 Fall Economic and Fiscal Statement: Some Thoughts

 

Finance Minister Bethlenfalvy released Ontario’s fall 2023 fiscal and economic update and a perusal of the numbers tells a number of stories.  First, the province is expecting the economy to slow down with consequent effects on its revenues though the current outlook for the current fiscal year 2023-24 shows tax revenues up just over 3 percent while 2024-25 and 2025-26 are currently projected at growth of 3.3 and 6.1 percent respectively.  Indeed, the period from 2022-23 to 2024-26 is expecting to see total revenues up 14 percent.  Over the same period total program spending is expected to rise  by 8.5 percent, debt interest by 22.6 percent and total expenditure will be up by 9.4 percent. 

 

Thus, revenues are projected to grow faster than expenditures but the gap between revenues and expenditures will persist until 2025-26 when a small surplus of 500 million dollars is forecast.  However, given spending that year includes a reserve of $2 billion set aside, it is likely the surplus that year will be much bigger. An economic slowdown notwithstanding, the province appears to want to keep a deficit on the books for as long as possible no doubt in part as a cautionary measure given economic uncertainty but also to quell demands for more public spending.  And as for economic uncertainty, employment is expected to grow each year until 2026 and the unemployment rate at its highest will reach 6.6 percent before declining to 5.8 percent by 2026. Hardly the recessions and downturns of yesteryear.

 

However, two items did catch my eye.  First, for 2023-24, the net public debt is expected to take a bit of a leap to $416 billion.  From 2018-19 to 2023-24, the net debt will have grown from $338 billion to $416 billion, an increase of 78 billion dollars or 23 percent.  However, deficits over that same period only sum to $42 billion.  In other words, an amount over and above the sum of accumulated deficits of $36 billion has been added to the net debt.  While this is of course likely the result of current government accounting practices that book capital and infrastructure expenditures separately from the operating expenditures, it is nevertheless a sizeable increase to see. 

 

More seriously, is the following.  If one takes past, current, and projected nominal GDP for Ontario, factors in inflation using the CPI as well as assumes population growth going forward at the medium Finance Ministry scenario of 250,000 people a year (about 1.7 percent), one gets a picture of real per capita GDP in Ontario that suggests that by 2025, real per capita GDP will be no higher than it was in 2017.  If one looks at the accompanying figure, despite ebbs and flows (with a particularly large ones circa the pandemic) as well as the early 1990s) real per capita GDP growth has been noticeably slower since about 2000.  The average annual growth rate in real per capita GDP from 1960 to 1999 averaged 2.1 percent while from 2000 to what is projected by 2025 the growth rate is 0.5 percent. 

 

 


 

You can blame some of this on population growing more quickly over the last few years, but the real culprit is that productivity growth in Ontario is lack lustre.  The long-term effects of productivity decline have begun to manifest themselves in our standard of living.  Real per capita GDP in 2022 in $2020 is $64,170.  If since 2000, real per capita GDP had grown at the average annual rate from 1960 to 1999, in 2022 it would be about $86,000 – that is a difference in output of nearly $22,000 per Ontarian.  It is not apparent that this stark difference has sunk in yet across political and policy circles in Ontario.  We have foregone a lot of output given our productivity decline and in the absence of a shift, that amount will only continue to grow.

 

 

Wednesday 20 September 2023

Strong Mayors and Housing: Thunder Bay Edition

 

Thunder Bay City Council this week did not support Mayor Ken Boshcoff’s desire to acquire “strong mayor powers” in a quest to meet provincial targets for housing and reap the benefits of associated funding support.  In some respects, this is not a surprise, not so much because members of council are so concerned about local democracy but because it does represent an erosion of their power given that strong powers on offer allow mayors to pass bylaws with the support of just one third of council, as well as veto bylaws passed by council on matters involving provincial priorities. In addition, the mayor will be able to propose the city budget, reorganize city departments and hire or fire the city manager and even some department heads. If anything, this represents a major potential increase in workload for the Office of the Mayor and one suspects there will eventually be some hiring to provide the necessary support.

 

Thunder Bay City Council because of its unique structure of at-large and ward councillors has always had councillors whose electoral mandate pretty much matched that of the mayor given they were elected by city-wide voters.  What the new changes mean in Thunder Bay and indeed in municipalities across the province is that the power structure has been unilaterally changed by the province in an effort to get the provincial housing agenda kick-started.  Indeed, going down the road, what some future mayor might do with such powers is a real concern. Nevertheless, it would appear that the mayor is going to ask for those powers with or without council support because the mayor wants to commit Thunder Bay to a target set by the province of 2,200 new homes by 2031.

 

This target is an interesting one because it means that over the next eight years (2024 to 2031), Thunder Bay needs to build an average of 275 new housing units annually.  The accompanying figure plots the annual number of housing starts from 1972 to 2023 and also plots the annual target set at an average of 275 units per year.  The 2023 estimate is incomplete given that the numbers from Statistics Canada only go to August and the monthly average based on January to August is used to fill in the rest of the year.  Even that total seems an underestimate given the couple of large apartment projects that have emerged that might double the total for 2023.  

 


 

 

Needless to say, the target is an ambitious one given that since 2000, the annual average works out to about 105 units per year.  In other words, going forward, it will be expected that Thunder Bay has to achieve just over 2.5 times the number of starts than it has managed on average over the last two decades. 

 

Can a strong mayor somehow wield the influence and power to more than double the number of housing starts in Thunder Bay?  Given the shortage of building trade workers as well as the fact that for the houses to be built, there has to be a demand for the housing and interest rates have spiked at the moment, it will be a challenge.  Then there is the ability of developers to earn a profit on the new builds whether single detached houses, apartments, or condos, even with whatever financial support the province has in mind.  Again, one suspects this target may be a tough one to reach.  A lot depends on whether or not there really are a lot more people in Thunder Bay than official counts say there are and if those people are actually interested in permanent housing in Thunder Bay and more importantly have the ability to pay for it either as owners or renters.

 

One suspects that in the end, the real influence of strong mayor powers in Thunder Bay will not be so much on the future housing stock but on things like the city budget and even senior staffing.  The mayor’s position is about to get more important and as the adage goes, with great power comes great responsibility.

Monday 11 September 2023

Thunder Bay's Municipal Budget Woes

 

Well, Thunder Bay’s municipal budget opera season is now in full swing with assorted fiscal choruses and arias being played in lockstep as we move towards finalizing the 2024 budget.  Like many municipalities across Ontario, there is increasing budgetary pressure to raise taxes.  The narrative this budgetary opera season in Thunder Bay is a little more complicated because along with planning for 2024, there is also the matter of dealing with the remnants of the 2023 season.  This task has proven to be a bit more mettlesome than usual but the end result will probably be a fairly large tax increase in 2024.

 

Very often, the proposed budget generally includes a tax levy increase that is higher than what is eventually opted for as opposition mounts.  For example, the 2023 budget originally put forth 6.2 percent levy increase that went to 5.6 percent and then 5 percent but eventually passed at a 4.4 percent levy increase (after growth).  This before and after growth distinction is one that has always been a bit of a diversion because after all, a tax increase is a tax increase whether one factors in growth in the tax base or not.   One is indeed surprised that the recent increase in managerial salaries of 12 percent at the City of Thunder Bay was reported as a nominal increase rather than after growth or after inflation.

 

The last budget was a particularly vexing one mainly because the 2023 budget process was with a new council and they no doubt very much did not want to debut with one of the larger tax increases in recent history.  However, everything comes at a price and the price was taking one million dollars out of the reserve fund and the task of finding several million dollars more in terms of savings.

 

That process has not gone well, and one suspects behind the scenes municipal movers and shakers do not mind because they would be happier with a tax increase than cuts.  The initial round of cuts tended to deal with relatively high profile but small budget items such as cuts to fireworks, movie nights, and Christmas Day transit service as well as items like the sister cities program. As well, there were the controversial cuts to the Neebing Arena as well as outdoor rinks that in a hockey town like Thunder Bay generated more of a backlash.  Yet, the backlash was dealt with by delaying the cuts and taking a “survey” which is really not a survey at all. 

 

The survey site consists of a web page and link asking the question of whether you supported the proposed outdoor rink reduction and was really not a statistical survey but a consultation.  The over 80 percent opposition comes from the fact that there is a certain self-selection bias here in that the survey is voluntary and those opposed to the cut of 31 out of 39 outdoor rinks had a strong incentive to go on and register their opposition which explains the 80 percent opposition rate.  Needless to say, the odds are that after rousing public sympathy for the rinks, the next budget offering will be an orchestrated refrain about how we will have to raise taxes more if you want to keep the rinks open.

 

The reality is that the big money in the City of Thunder Bay budget is not to be found in hockey rinks or fireworks or movie nights but in two key areas: Public Safety and Public Works.  The accompanying figure has been constructed using the City of Thunder Bay’s own data and reveals that the Public Safety Category occupies nearly 40 percent of municipal spending while the Public Works Category is nearly 20 percent.  In other words, with nearly 60 percent of spending in these two categories, looking for cuts in the other 40 percent of spending is going to be difficult as a budget solution.  Even the claim that much of our spending is mandated by the “province” looks a little lame as the legislated programs category accounts for barely one percent of spending though some additional mandated spending is also internalized within some of the other categories.

 


 

 

In the end, the two largest potential sources of savings lie in Public Safety and Public Works, followed by Parks and Recreation, Contributions to Outside Boards and Agencies, Social Services and then Debt Charges. We are in a situation where without any serious attempt to sit down and examine them, the two largest categories are going to increasingly take a larger share of spending.  This will take money from quality-of-life categories such as Parks and Recreation (though oddly enough there is still interest in a new Turf facility on the part of the city administration but I guess that is the capital budget rather than the operating budget at least for now) and then contributions to associated community groups.  Cuts in these other categories will not be sufficient.

 

We are heading for a scenario where there will be higher taxes and fewer services.  It will be interesting to watch City Council and Administration sell that one.

Tuesday 15 August 2023

Homelessness in Ontario: Creative Solutions Needed, Not More Planning

 

Urban centres across Ontario and indeed all over Canada are experiencing a wave of homelessness as rents and home prices continue to rise.  The ranks of the homeless not only include those with mental illness with no family or support or urban foragers but working people who despite their incomes and work have been evicted as their units are renovated and higher rents charged and cannot find affordable housing. 

 

In Hamilton, tent encampments are dotting the city and as of December 2022 there are an estimated 1,509 people experiencing homelessness.  In Toronto a somewhat more dated estimates puts the number of homeless people at over 7,000. In Thunder Bay, well over 200 are experiencing homelessness while the number experiencing chronic homelessness is around 600 people.  Encampments in parks and assorted green space in or around downtown areas have become health hazards to the residents in the absence of proper sanitary facilities and in parks the prospect of taking children to play with tents nearby has become understandably  disconcerting for parent.

 

The approaches to dealing with the problem and the strong debates involved are highlighted by what is going on in Hamilton.  The most recent proposal has been a plan to “pitch” tiny homes on Strachan Street East just off the downtown area rather than have sanctioned encampments.  Hamilton councillors have given early support for this revised encampment protocol as a pilot with plans to ultimately set up six such sites that would accommodate about 160 people.   

 

There has of course been debate and opposition because quite frankly, the narrative around this process is misleading because you do not “pitch” a cabin, you erect or build one.  Once you physically build something, it is not temporary but likely to become permanent especially given the torpor and inertia that accompanies most government decision making these days at all three levels of government.  One only need visit other parts of the world to see what a poorly policed or implemented tiny homes program could devolve to: essentially urban shantytowns.

 

Of course, even if such a program is approved, one suspects that given the plethora of plans, regulations, and processes at assorted levels of government, it will take a long and expensive time to get anything done.  After all, Hamilton has been working on a housing and homelessness strategy of various sorts since 2004 and here we are 20 years later and we are still working on solving the problem. If one checks in on Hamilton Housing and Homelessness Action Plan, here is the progress:

 

    May 7, 2018: Housing and Homelessness Action Plan Update

    December 12, 2016: Council receives 2015 and 2016 Report to the Community

    June 24, 2015: Council receives 2014 Report to the Community

    December 9. 2013: Council endorsement of Phase Two

    June 11, 2012: Council endorsement of Phase One

    October 2010: Housing and Homelessness Planning Group was convened to provide guidance to staff in the development of the Housing and Homelessness Action Plan.

    2007: Council approved Everyone Has a Home: A Strategic Plan to Address Homelessness, Hamilton’s first comprehensive plan to address homelessness.

    2004: Council approved Keys to the Home: A Housing Strategy for Hamilton, first housing strategy for the city since amalgamation.

 

Planning as a substitute for action has become an affliction at all levels of government in Canada and Hamilton’s homeless action plan has probably been about as effective in dealing with homelessness as the myriad of northern Ontario economic development plans have been in jump starting the northern Ontario economy. And with three levels of government using federalism not as a cooperative apparatus to tailor programs to local needs but as an excuse for passing the buck, we are a long way from addressing homelessness and housing issues at a national level.

 

What to do? Honestly, there is no quick and easy solution, but solutions do require some creativity, a willingness to work together to solve problems and the will and capacity to move and get something done.  Sometimes that requires a crisis or natural disaster.  Case in point?  The Great Haileybury fire of 1922.  In the fall of 1922, a massive wildfire hit the town of Haileybury in northern Ontario and several surrounding communities killing 43 people and leaving thousands homeless just before the onset of a northern Ontario winter.  The solution, a quick and rapid improvisation that saw 87 streetcars from Toronto being sent up and fitted out with stoves and used as temporary accommodations.

 

Honestly, could such a solution work today?  One imagines that there a lot of retired VIA railcars, TTC streetcars and GO Transit cars lying about that could be repurposed and set up on some of the sites being proposed for permanent encampments or tiny home subdivisions.  Being streetcars rolled in and set up with sanitary facilities, heat, and air conditioning, they would look better than the myriad of tents or tiny cabins being proposed.  And being rail cars on wheels, one might be able to afford the illusion that they are indeed temporary even though all of us know they are going to be around for a long time.  However, being in built up urban areas, they might even be considered a little funky and eventually become part of the landscape in a more palatable way than tents willy-nilly and assorted mounds of garbage.

 

Mark my words, this is not a permanent solution nor should it be but in the absence of any real steps towards effective urban solutions, moving on a solution like this might be the best way to move forward in at least a limited fashion.

 


 

Thursday 3 August 2023

Recession Anyone?

 

Well, despite the talk of recession and rumours of recession in the wake of Bank Rate increases around the world, to date the economy not just in Canada and also the United States and indeed in many other countries, remains relatively robust.  At the same time, inflation is coming down.  The narrative is only slowly starting to shift to explanations of why the economy is doing so well with a myriad of possible stories, the most entertaining is that what we are having is a “vibecession” in which people continue to spend unabated while externalizing anxiety that a recession is coming with the anxiety being aided and abetted by constant media stories on why interest rate increases will eventually bring a recession.  Or perhaps we are experiencing some type of economic cognitive dissonance in which spending all that pandemic cash makes us uncomfortable, so we project fears of coming recession to assuage our consumer guilt.  Needless to say, interest rates are continuing to rise and at some point there may or may not be a recession.

 

In the interim, any indicator is useful.  Statistics Canada has put out experimental monthly business data (Table 33-10-0279-01) that estimates the total number of active businesses as well as openings and closures for Canada, the provinces and Census Metropolitan Areas.  If there are glimmers of recession in the air, one might expect to see a slowdown in the growth of total active businesses or even a decline is business closures exceed new openings.  Figures 1 and 2 provide charts of some this data (Total active businesses and business closures) for Canada, Ontario, and four Ontario cities (Thunder Bay and Sudbury are included as after all this is Northern Economist).  And, because of the size differences between national level and CMA data, an index is calculated and used with January 2022 numbers set to 100 for all.

 

 


 

 

 


 

Both Canada and Ontario are above where they were in January of 2022 in terms of the total active number of businesses.  Since January 2023, there was a bit of a decline though it was followed by a rebound from March to April of 2023 where the data ends. This pattern appears to also mark Toronto and Hamilton. However, Greater Sudbury has seen a persistent decline since May of 2022 as did Thunder Bay though it was followed by a rebound after February 2023.  Nevertheless, all these geographic entities had more active businesses in April 2023 than at the start in January of 2022.  This suggests that overall, there have been on average more openings than closures. Figure 2 plots an index of business closings and again there are fluctuations but no discernible overall upward trend over the January 2022 to April 2023 period. If anything, there was a rise in business closures from about June 2022 to October 2022 and then a decline in business closures from about October of 2022 to January 2023 with a reversal since. 

 

The Bank of Canada began its current tightening cycle in March of 2022 and within a few months the number of closures began to rise but that was soon reversed.  Overall, there have been healthy amounts of new businesses created that have countered closures explaining why overall, the number of active businesses are up.  This data suggests that any recession if at all is still down the road.  Or, the soft landing that was envisioned is what has been engineered.

Wednesday 21 June 2023

Recent Employment Growth in Ontario: A Snapshot

 When it comes to employment growth, the Canadian and Ontario economies are still growing relatively robustly despite nearly a year of Bank rate increases that aim to cool off the economy and inflation.  The accompanying figure presents the percent change in total employment (monthly data, three-month moving average, not seasonally adjusted) across Ontario and its main economic regions over two recent time periods: May 2022 to May 2023 (over one year) and January 2023 to May 2023 (the last five months).  The results suggest overall robust growth but with some major differences across the province.

 


Year over year (May 2022 to May 2023), employment in Ontario as a whole has grown nearly 2 percent with the period from January 2023 to May 2023 growing at just below 1.5 percent.  Year over year growth was highest in Windsor-Sarnia (9 percent) followed by the Kitchener-Waterloo-Barrie area (7 percent), Muskoka-Kawartha (5 percent) and then the Northwest (4 percent).  Toronto and Ottawa also saw growth year over year at about 2 percent respectively.  The latter two account for most of the job creation in Ontario despite the lower growth rate because well over half of Ontario employment is in these two cities.  

What does stand out in these employment growth numbers is that some parts of Ontario are not doing as well as others.  Kingston-Pembroke, Hamilton-Niagara, London and Northeastern Ontario have seen employment decline both year-over-year and since January of this year.  While Windsor is up significantly year-over-year, it turns out that 2023 has seen much slower growth.  Stratford-Bruce is down year-over-year but there has been growth in 2023.  Then there is Northwestern Ontario which appears to be in the midst of a relatively strong employment surge.  

So, overall Ontario is still booming.  Over the period 2006 to 2023, average annual monthly employment growth has been approximately 1.2 percent so growth rates in the 1.5 to 2 percent range mean Ontario as a whole is still doing exceptionally well.  True, these growth rates are down from the immediate rebound of the post pandemic era but overall since May of 2022 Ontario has added 144,000 jobs which averages to about 12,000 jobs a month - well above historical performance.  On average, since 2006 Ontario has added about 7500 jobs a month.  As for the regions exhibiting slowdowns in employment creation, they are in many respects areas where longer-term economic and employment growth has consistently been a challenge with the exception of the Northwest which seems to be seeing a robust uptick rooted in forestry, mining and tourism as well as public sector construction.

So, with the first half of 2023 nearly done, it appears Ontario overall is in good shape.

Thursday 1 June 2023

Ontario's Net Debt: A Long Term Overview

 

With all the focus on the US debt ceiling political debate, it is sometimes easy to lose focus on our own debt situation at both the federal and provincial levels.  Taking a long-term view on Ontario’s net public debt of course requires data and as part of my ongoing efforts on putting together Ontario’s fiscal history, I have been able to get Ontario’s provincial government net public debt back to 1914.  The data comes from two sources.  First, there are the more recent numbers going from 1966 to the present which are obtainable from Finances of the Nation and the Ontario Financing Authority.  As for the pre-1966 numbers, there are a number of provincial budgets from the early and mid-1960s which among other things contain a lot of historical data on revenues, expenditures, deficits and debt.

Ontario from 1867 and into the early 20th century generally ran surpluses largely due to the bountiful natural resource revenues from forestry and mining rents and royalties.  The acquisition of large amounts of capital debt appear to coincide with northern Ontario infrastructure development of the early 20th century – in particular the advent of the Temiskaming and Northern Ontario railroad circa 1902. Further expansions of debt occur during and after World War I with the advent of the motor care and provincial highways as well as the expansion of the hydroelectric grid.  And of course, there is the Great Depression which played havoc with public finances.   Ontario’s net debt numbers begin in 1914 (See figure 1) at just over 6 million dollars and by1945 had reached 480 million dollars.  Between 1945 and 1960, Ontario’s net debt grows to 994 million and in 1961 Ontario’s net debt tops one billion dollars.  By 1980, Ontario’s net debt had reached nearly 11 billion dollars and grew to just over 35 billion by 1990.  It is the period since 1990 that sees an even more rapid expansion of nominal net debt growing to 134 billion dollars by 2000, 194 billion dollars in 2010 and then about 380 billion dollars by 2022.  Over 90 percent of Ontario’s net public debt has been acquired since 1990.

 


 

 

 

Of course, nominal numbers alone are not sufficient as it is the size of the debt relative to the economy - the net debt to GDP ratio – that matters more.  Figure 2 illustrates this quite nicely.  The Great Depression era sees a first peak of the Ontario net debt to GDP ratio in the 15 to 20 percent range.  It then falls and levels off at about 5 percent going into the 1970s.  After that it begins an overall rise with particularly steep jumps during periods of recession – in particular, the early 1990s, and the era of the Great Recession/Financial Crisis 2007 to 2010.  As a result of fairly generous federal transfer support, the pandemic did not see as large a spike in Ontario’s net debt to GDP ratio as these other two periods.  

 


 

 

In the end, while the size of the provincial debt in nominal terms seems to shake a lot of people, it is debt relative to the size of the economy that should generate greater concern.  The Great Depression Era aside, Ontario generally had a net debt to GDP ratio at about five percent up
until the 1970s.  The period since the 1970s represents a period where the ratio has generally trended upwards.  If one defines fiscal sustainability as a stable or declining net debt to GDP ratio, then the period before 1970 can be seen as one where Ontario’s revenue and expenditure structure was generally fiscally sustainable.  One cannot say the same with respect to the period since 1970.  And yet, it would appear that despite occasional fits of rhetoric, Ontario has not been stirred to action when it comes to its net debt.

 


 

Thursday 18 May 2023

Post Pandemic Business Recovery: Some Are Doing Better Than Others

The COVID-19 pandemic  had a devastating effect on Canada’s business sector and new data is emerging that helps illustrate the size of the drop in business activity as well as the subsequent recovery.  Figure 1 uses data from Statistics Canada (Table 33-10-0270-01 Experimental estimates for business openings and closures for Canada, provinces and territories, census metropolitan areas, seasonally adjusted) to generate an index of active businesses for four Ontario cities as well as the province of Ontario.  It sets January of 2016 equal to 100.  For example if in January of 2016 you had 1200 active business and in January of 2023 you had 1500, then January of 2016 would be equal to 100 and January of 2023 would be 125.  Everyone starts at 100 in order to generate comparisons that would not be easy to see if the absolute number of business are used.  For example as of January 2023 Thunder Bay had 2,832 active business while Toronto had 192,016 which would not yield terribly useful visuals if plotted together.  

 


 

 

The chart is for Ontario and four cities: Thunder Bay, Greater Sudbury, Toronto and Hamilton.  With the exception of Thunder Bay and Sudbury, there was growth in the number of active businesses from 2016 to 2020 and then a dramatic drop which affected everyone.  From January to May 2020 there was 14.6 percent drop in the number of active Ontario businesses.  Toronto saw a drop of 15.8 percent followed by Hamilton at 13.4 percent, then Thunder Bay at 11.5 percent and Sudbury at 10.3 percent.  A recovery then begins but Thunder Bay and Sudbury unlike Ontario as a whole or Hamilton or Toronto barely match their pre-pandemic number of active businesses by 2023.  Indeed, if one looks at the entire 2016 to 2023 period(See Figure 2), Thunder Bay sees a decline of 3.8 percent while Sudbury is down one one-tenth of one percent.  Relative to 2016, the number of active businesses is up 8.6 percent in Toronto, 9.3 percent in Hamilton and 7.9 percent in Ontario as a whole.  

 


 

 

Pandemic impact aside, Thunder Bay and Sudbury seem to be suffering from a longer term set of problems with business activity given that they were experiencing a decline prior to the pandemic.  Between January 2016 and December 2019, Thunder Bay saw 124 fewer active business while Sudbury saw 40 fewer business.  After the pandemic drop, both of these cities recovered but only to approximately where they were prior to the pandemic.  Over the longer term, business formation has been weak and represents a serious economic challenge.