Canada's Effective Tariff Rate: 1870 to 2024

 

I had a recent piece in The Hub dealing with President Trump’s current tariff policies that included a chart on the average effective tariff rate on US imports from 1870 to the present.  In its wake, Almos Tassonyi contacted me and asked if I was planning to do something similar for Canada.  Honestly, it had not occurred to me but thanks to Almos for the suggestion and this post presents data on Canada’s effective tariff rate on imports.  It is just in time for Prime Minister Carney’s trip to Washington and he might like to point out that historically, Canada has had lower effective tariff rates on imports than the United States.  But then, that should not be surprising given that we have always been a small open economy with trade as an important contributor to our economy.

The accompanying chart plots both the US average effective tariff rate taken from the previous article on The Hub alongside the Canadian average effective tariff rate. The average effective tariff is the ratio of tariff revenues to the total value of all imports rather than tariff revenues to the value of dutiable goods imported. Since 1870, the average tariff rates on dutiable imports have been higher than the average effective rate.  And of course, the actual rates imposed are higher in relation to effective tariff rates whether based on the value of imports or the value of dutiable goods.  For example, during the National Policy Tariffs (1879-1897), the rates on manufactured imported goods ranged from 17.5 to 45 percent with some goods of course free of tariffs.

The data on tariff revenues and the value of total imports for Canada is taken from several sources: The Jorda-Schularick-Taylor Macrodata Base, Historical Statistics of Canada (H1-18), the 2024 Fiscal Reference Tables (Table 6) and FRED.  Figure 1 plots the Canadian average effective tariff rate alongside the US one and both have declined over time.  Over the entire 1870 to 2024 period, the average annual Canadian effective tariff on imports has been 9.9 percent compared to 12.5 percent for the United States – 21 percent lower. There have been periods when our effective rate has been below the US rate but also periods when it has been above. 

From 1870 to 1914, the annual average US effective tariff rate was 27 percent while ours was 17 percent.  During the WWI period (1914 to 1918), the Canadian average was 17 percent while the US fell to 10 percent.  During the 1920s, the average rates of the two countries tracked quite closely but after 1930, the trade war era of the Smoot-Hawley tariffs saw the average US tariff from 1930 to 1939 at 17 percent while Canada’s was at 14 percent.  The post-World War II period is marked by a steady decline in average effective tariff rates in both countries with the 1950s to the 1970s seeing generally higher rates in Canada than the United States.  The average annual effective tariff rate in Canada from 1950 to 1979 was 7.5 percent while for the United States it was 6 percent.  The late 1980s saw the arrival of the Canada-US Free trade Agreement and the 1990s saw NAFTA and in their wake, tariffs came down.  However, since 1990 the average US effective tariff rate has been higher than Canada’s. From 1990 to 2024, the annual average Canadian effective tariff rate on total imports was 1.1 percent while for the United States it was 2 percent – nearly double the Canadian rate.

 

 

Going forward, the average US effective tariff rates are going to be higher, but it is uncertain where exactly they will land.  At present, estimates have ranged from 14 percent to over 20 percent, but these are likely to be unsustainable in a world that is more globalized and interdependent that current US policy makers seem to realize.  However, I would not be that surprised to see effective average tariff rates return to and stabilize at late 1970s to early 1980s levels which would bring us close to about 5 percent.  That does appear to be the time period where many of the current President's economic views, such as they are, were nurtured. Time will tell.

 

 

 

 

Canada's Trade with the USA Has been Shifting for Some time

 

NAFTA and its successor CUSMA have been instrumental in growing Canada’s trade and its economy by helping us find markets that have grown our export sector.  These agreements have helped cement an economic relationship with the United States such that by 2024 “ the combined value of Canada's imports and exports of goods traded with the United States surpassed the $1 trillion mark for a third consecutive year. In 2024, the United States was the destination for 75.9% of Canada's total exports and was the source of 62.2% of Canada's total imports.”  (Source: Statistics Canada, https://www150.statcan.gc.ca/n1/daily-quotidien/250205/dq250205a-eng.htm)

However, interestingly enough, the importance of the United States as a merchandise export market has actually declined somewhat and the composition of our exports to them has shifted also.  Since 1999, the total value of Canadian merchandise exports to the United States grew by over 90 percent but the value of our merchandise exports to all other countries aside from the United States grew by nearly 280 percent.  As a result, the US share of our exports declined from 87 percent in 1999 to 76 percent at present.  As well, there has been a compositional shift. 

In 1999, 30 percent of the value of our merchandise exports to the United States was motor vehicles and parts but this share declined to 11 percent by 2022.  The greatest growth in the value of our merchandise exports to the United States since 1999 was energy products, followed by metal ores and then farm, fish and food products.  Over the period 1999 to 2022, the energy share of our exports went from 9 to 34 percent, metal ores from 1 to 2 percent and farm, fish and food products went from 2 percent to 4 percent.  On the other hand, the share of forestry products declined from 13 to 8 percent, electronic and consumer goods declined from 8 percent to 3 percent, aircraft and transportation products from 3 percent to 2 percent.  In many respects, the long-term effects of NAFTA/CUSMA appear to be a decline in our export share of value-added manufacturing products and an increase in less value-added resource products.

This is of course all rather odd when viewed in the context of the Trump Administration’s desire to impose tariffs on Canadian exports.  If the goal is to move auto manufacturing out of Canada, it’s importance as a Canadian export driver has already been in decline.    If the goal is to make Canada hewers of wood and drawers of water to the American so to speak by having it specialize in resource inputs to the American economy – that is already happening.  While there have been some increases in Canada’s exports of consumer goods, metal products and industrial equipment, by far the largest increase has been in energy products.   

President Trump seems hell-bent on tariffs and applying them to everything - including energy.  Why the Americans would subject such an important input into their economy to tariffs seems rather incomprehensible.  Given our share of their energy needs, one suspects their demand is quite inelastic meaning  that energy tariffs will have few output and employment effects in Canada and the tariff will be borne primarily by the American consumer.  There may be an incentive for Americans to try and negotiate energy prices downward to compensate for the tariff impact on their consumers  but that essentially means that Americans want to have cheaper Canadian energy and use tariffs on our energy as a revenue source and ultimately have us pay for both these goals.   Why Canada would want to subsidize American energy consumers in this manner is an interesting question.  It will be crucial for Canada to quickly find alternate energy markets to forestall such a scenario.

 

 

 

Harris or Trump? For Canada, Post November 4th Is Going to Be a Challenge

 

As we move into the final sprint of the US election, it bears as always to pay attention to the economic implications for Canada.  Whatever one’s political priors or favorites may be in this election, in the end it needs to be realized that when it comes to US trade and economic interests, it does not matter whether Trump or Harris wins– American interests trump (no pun intended) Canadian ones.  And in the case of the economy and our trade relationship with the United States, be prepared for some tough bargaining.  While 2024 marked the 30^th Anniversary of NAFTA, it has since 2020 been replaced by the USMCA or CUSMA agreement with renewal talks beginning in 2026. 

 

Along with perennial sticking points like milk and dairy or softwood lumber, in the United States, despite what economists and evidence might say about economic growth and the benefits of trade in the wake of NAFTA and CUSMA, the debate will be shaped by the widespread belief that NAFTA in particular resulted in job losses and wage stagnation.   In the case of manufacturing, the accompanying graphic summarizes quite nicely why the Americans are going to be playing hardball.  In many respects, US manufacturing job losses did coincide with NAFTA. 

 

Figure 1 presents annual Canadian and American manufacturing employment from 1976 to 2023 using a dual scale since US employment and population in general is about ten times ours.  In 1994, there were nearly 19 million Americans employed in manufacturing and 1.8 million in Canada. In the decade afterwards, by 2005, US manufacturing employment fell to 16.2 million while Canadian manufacturing grew to 2.2 million.  In the wake of NAFTA, American manufacturing employment fell by 14 percent while Canadian manufacturing employment rose by 20 percent. 

 

 

 

 Since 2005, American manufacturing employment has declined slightly to 15.6 million while Canada’s declined to about 1.8 million where it has stabilized somewhat.  In other words, over thirty years, Canada has stayed flat in terms of total manufacturing employment (notwithstanding the rise and fall from 1994 to about 2010) while the US has seen a decline.  The good news is that since about 2019, as evidenced by the 5^th order polynomial smoothing line, both countries have seen a slight increase in manufacturing employment as a result of fallout from the pandemic, trade issues with China and the rise of onshoring production activities.

 

Yet those same polynomial smooths show a pretty consistent decline for the US since 1976 with Canada doing somewhat better.  True, Canada is not to blame for the decline in US manufacturing.  Both countries have seen a decline in manufacturing employment over time both in absolute numbers as well as a share of total employment.  It is not 1960 anymore.  There have been productivity issues in both countries as well as intense competition starting in the 1990s from China and other Asian economies as well as Mexico which is/was a part of CUSMA/NAFTA.  However, that does not matter.  For the United States, creating jobs in manufacturing will mean looking at all the players – including Canada.  It will not matter whether Harris or trump becomes President in this regard.  Notice has been served.

International Relations & Trade Discussion Missing in Current Federal Election Campaign

Monday's Federal Leader's debate made nary a mention of international trade, our current dispute with China or even what is going on with the USMCA ratification in the United States.  With exports accounting for about 30% of our GDP, it is astounding that such an important issue is being ignored.  It is therefore worth re-posting the piece I had published early this week on the Fraser Institute Blog.

Canada needs more major trading partners beyond China and the U.S.

First Appeared in Fraser Blog , October 7^th, 2019

On the campaign trail, there’s little talk about Canadian trade policy and the repercussions of our current poor political relationship with China. The need to continue diversifying our trade is the elephant in the room this federal election.

In what seems to be explicit retaliation over the Meng Wanzhou Affair, China has detained Canadian citizens—putting a chill on business travel there—and essentially halted our exports of meat and canola. Any memories of Norman Bethune appear to have faded as China reveals its view of us as a small, inconsequential and puny power that should do as told. As a result, an important trade strategy—to diversify our trade away from dependence on what has also become a more capricious United States—lies in tatters.

The U.S. takes nearly 75 per cent of our exports, and despite recent bumps, has been by international trade standards a dream trade partner. It’s a large, rich, populous market literally on our doorstep where we share a close political and social culture, common language and history. It’s a market economy like ours with a strong rule of law. Subsequently, Canadians have not had to work very hard when it comes to exports given that the access to such a profitable market has historically been easy. A one stop export market for 75 per cent of your exports has become the gold standard of Canadian trade policy.

But Canadian business has been seduced by the prospects of China’s growing economy and the vision of a rich market of 1.4 billion people as a sort of future U.S.-like trade relationship. China has rapidly industrialized and is developing a large, dense and wealthy market. At first, it even seemed to be moving towards a more liberal market order in its economy.

Yet despite early promise, it would appear China is only playing lip service to liberal economic values and seems set on explicitly using trade relationships as part of its diplomatic and political arsenal, given that it views government policy and trade relationships as one dominion. Its recent behaviour raises an important question: Do we really want to ever be in a situation where 75 per cent of our exports are dependent on China’s market? Do we really want to give the Chinese government a quasi-monopoly over both our trade and political affairs?

It really would be the road to serfdom.

Despite the large dollar value of our trade relationship with China, it currently still only represents five per cent of our exports. Trade is about free exchange and mutually beneficial gains. If China wants our trade goods, we should certainly sell them as part of a free and open bargaining process. However, if it wants to use its economic relationships as a tool to get its way when dealing with countries on other issues, then we must protect ourselves. We are a small open economy dependent on trade and we must diversify our trade. Our recent efforts in negotiating agreements with the EU and the Trans-Pacific are only a start. We need many countries to compete for our business, but to do so we also need to show interest and compete for theirs. Part of this also involves reducing our own protectionism (agricultural supply management would be a good place to start).

If the Asia-Pacific is the future of trade, then look for opportunities in other wealthy Asian countries. Japan, India, Thailand, Vietnam, Taiwan, Singapore, Malaysia, Indonesia and the Philippines are all important economies that can serve as markets for Canadian products.

Moreover, instead of waiting for government-led initiatives, Canadian businesses should start the process themselves. Rather than placing all your eggs in a one-shot market-access strategy in the hopes that China can one day replicate our success in the U.S., shift your markets to other partners. Make sure there are a lot of them so no one country can ever hold our economy hostage. This should become the new gold standard for Canadian trade policy.

Canada and the New International Age

Well, it has been a breath-taking week in international affairs and the best indicator yet that so to speak, “Toto, we’re not in Kansas anymore.” By acting on a US legal request to arrest for extradition Huawei CFO Meng Wanzhou, Canada has earned an over the top response from China that to date has also been accompanied by the arrest of two Canadians in China on “national security” concerns.  The response of the Chinese government and media includes words like “revenge” and “heavy price” with respect to what Canada will face if Meng Wanzhou is not ultimately released.  This all comes at a time when China’s economy is increasingly seen as a source of opportunity for Canada with a desire to boost trade via sectoral agreements.

And to top it all off, President Trump has basically made Canada look like the ultimate puppet state by arguing that he could intervene in the dispute and let Meng Wanzhou off the hook if it was useful in securing trade concessions from China.  The Rule Breaker in Chief has made it apparent that he is just fine without a rules-based international order.  There really is very little that seems to distinguish the tenor of the President’s behaviour from that of other authoritarian leaders around the world.  God bless America for a constitution that has a division of powers and checks and balances for otherwise all of this could be much worse – as hard as that might be to believe.

It goes without saying that it is becoming an increasingly difficult time for a small open economy on the world stage.  Over the last year, the NAFTA negotiations with the United States and Mexico involved public insults directed at Canada’s leadership while Saudi Arabia had a major tantrum over our views on human rights issues.  Even if Canada had done a better job of politically tiptoeing around these assorted landmines, it remains that we would still get bullied because we are viewed as small and not of sufficient consequence.  Even China’s recent diatribes against us are really directed at the United States given that they can send it a message by targeting what they obviously perceive to be its “vassal” state.  So much for their respect for us.

While China undoubtedly has some valid points in this diplomatic dispute as expressed by its Ambassador to Canada in a recent Globe opinion piece, it remains that its behaviour is reflective of an insecure adolescent on the world stage.  When a country of 1.3 billion people that claims to be an up and coming world superpower unleashes such an stream of invective and vitriol on a small country of 37 million people, one does not see an injured party but a bully.  Only a bully terrorizes the small fry while treading lightly with the bigger kids.

So where is this going next?  Well, it is unfortunate Canada cannot seriously consider getting a membership with the European Union because quite frankly, it has become a pretty friendless world.  We can’t even rely much on our Anglosphere friends because Australia and New Zealand are small like us while the United States is on a world disorder frenzy and the British are busy immolating themselves over Brexit.  So, we are on our own.

We need to do what we do best.  Remain polite and play the hand that we have been dealt as best we can and ride out the storm.  Weather analogies are good - we can't control the weather, we only deal with it and Canadians are used to dealing with bad weather.  We need to reach out to the Chinese at a senior level and reassure them that we are doing everything we can to resolve this issue in a fair, responsible and rules based manner.  We need to reach out to the Americans and ask for reassurance that this is not just a trade manoeuvre and request that this matter be dealt with expeditiously.  If anything, we might want to try and bring the two sides together to seek a diplomatic solution though given the rhetoric to date we would risk getting side swiped by both sides. 

In the end, this will get resolved and life will go on.  Indeed, President Trump’s own words provide the best excuse for us releasing Meng Wanzhou immediately – obviously, he thinks the arrest is a trade bargaining chip and not a matter of national security.  If we were more opportunistic, that is exactly what we would do and stick it to the Americans given that they have no qualms about throwing us under the bus.  However, we are polite and follow rules.

However, once the dust has settled, we really need to re-evaluate and review our international relationships – especially those involving the United States and China.  In the case of the United States, given our economic integration and the fact that they take 75 percent of our exports, there is going to be little we can do except hope for the day when a new and more reasonable administration takes the White House.  We share a continent with the Americans and not with China and that is that.  They can be bullies too when occasion warrants but our ties with them have been long standing.  In a sense, we are not caught in the middle between China and the United States, we are with the US given our shared history and geography.

As for China, well that requires some more thought.  Given mercurial and aggressive behaviour on the part of China when they don’t get their way and their willingness to bully, we do need to be very careful that we do not become as dependent on their economy as we have become with the Americans.  I’m not sure the Chinese market is worth greater access to us given the potential costs to our businesses and our sovereignty when China decides they are unhappy with us and wish to punish us. Nobody likes being slapped around and if they do, you need to either break off the relationship or minimize contact via a more structured relationship.  It’s a big world and there are other customers for our wares.  We need to trade with countries that behave in a less vindictive manner when it comes to international issues.

Long Run Economic Performance: Comparing China, the UK and USA

In light of my recent contributions on China’s economic performance which have appeared in The Hill and on the Fraser Institute Blog, I thought it might be useful to provide the figures which underpin the longer-term analysis of their performance.  The data I used is from the Angus Maddison Database – the 2018 update – and the data is summarized in the accompanying Figures 1 and 2.

Figure 1 plots total real GDP from 1820 to 2016 in 2011 USD for the United States, the United Kingdom and China.  In 1820, China had a vastly larger economy than either the US or the UK with a real GDP of $325 billion compared to $69 billion for the UK or $21 billion for the USA.  Indeed, for much of economic history, China has always been the biggest economy in the world as a result of its massive population.  In 1820, China had a population of 381 million people compared to 10 million for the United States and 21 million for the UK.  However, the 19^th century was not kind to China and by 1870, China’s economy had shrunk to $270 billion but it was still larger than the United States at $150 billion and the UK at $179 billion. 

 

Total GDP of both the US and the UK grew quickly as a result of late nineteenth century industrialization with the US matching the UK in 1878 and then pulling ahead in terms of total GDP.  By 1887, the US economy at $306 billion was larger than China at $274 billion and the UK at $228 billion.  By the eve of the First World War in 1913, the US economy at $791 billion was nearly twice the size of both the UK and China at $368 billion and $344 billion respectively. In the period since WWI, the United States grew rapidly and by the mid 1970s was over five times the size of the UK economy and about five times larger than China’s economy.

China had a Communist revolution in 1949 but economic performance in its aftermath - while substantial - was not as robust when compared to the last forty years.  From 1950 to 1975, China real GDP grows from $348 billion to $1.2 trillion – a tripling of output.  However, things for China really take off with the first economic reforms and liberalization of the 1970s and from 1975 to 2016, its economy expands from $1.2 trillion to $17.3 trillion.  Over the 1975 to 2016 period, the US economy expanded from $5.6 trillion to 17.2 trillion while the UK expanded from $1 trillion to $2.5 trillion.

In 2016, China re-assumed its historical role as the world’s largest economy.  Yet, as I pointed out in my oped pieces, this is not the end of the story.  Despite its impressive and rapid economic growth in terms of total output, China still lags when it comes to per capita output. As Figure 2 shows, over the entire 1820 to 2016 period, China has always had a lower per capita GDP than either the UK or the US and the relative gap has not changed all that much despite the rapid growth of the last 40 years.  In 1820, per capita GDP in China was about 26 percent that of the UK and 41 percent that of the USA.  By 1975, its per capita GDP was 7 percent that of the UK and 5 percent that of the United States.  After the robust growth of the post 1975 period, by 2016 per capita Chinese GDP now stands at 34 percent that of the UK and 24 percent that of the US.

 

So, China has done very well but it still has a long way to go.  Its rapid extensive growth masks the fact that large swaths of its population are still quite poor.  Its economy is showing signs of economic and political fragility given its aging population, large debt levels and economic inequality and this has global implications.  Such fragility is probably a reason for its more authoritarian turn in recent years under President Xi Jinping.  After the rapid growth and improvement in living standards of the last few decades, any economic slowdown may create a politically volatile domestic mix of discontent.

Wealth Inequality in the North Atlantic Anglosphere

I have been working on historical wealth and wealth inequality for most of my career and have put together a lot of my thinking and long-term analysis together in one spot - a new book published by Palgrave MacMillan in their Pivot series.  The ebook edition was released several days ago and is available on the Palgrave site.  The hard cover version should be available at the end of June or early July. If you want a short overview of the book, I put together a post for the Palgrave Exploring Economic History Blog that provides a nice summary of the book and some of its main ideas. An excerpt from the blog:

"Before 1750, wealth inequality was higher in the United Kingdom than the United States, but American inequality grew rapidly to match the United Kingdom by mid-nineteenth century. The preindustrial period was marked by lower wealth inequality in both the United States and the United Kingdom. The subsequent era of industrialization is marked in all three Anglosphere countries by rising wealth inequality. Wealth inequality declined in the twentieth century with redistribution away from the top one and ten percent. The decline in wealth inequality halted in the 1970s but with a rebound in American wealth inequality.
For the United Kingdom, the top 1 percent wealth share rose from an average of 25 percent in the pre-1850 period to 64 percent for the 1850 to 1900 period. More remarkably, the average share of wealth held by the top ten percent of the wealth distribution in the second half of the nineteenth century was just over 90 percent in the United Kingdom, approximately 72 percent in the United States and about 56 percent in Canada. By the early 21st century, Canada and the United Kingdom have their top ten percent with approximately 50 percent of wealth and the United States over 70 percent. Meanwhile the top one percent own just under 20 percent in Canada and the United Kingdom while in the United States the share is closer to 35 percent.
The twentieth century mitigation of wealth inequality correlates with several factors: rates of economic growth closer to the rate of return on capital, increased unionization rates, rising public spending on health and education, larger public sectors, increased home ownership rates, the onset of substantial estate taxation, more progressive income tax systems and in the case of the United Kingdom a housing policy that resulted in the disposition and dispersion of much public housing into private hands. A reduction in the strength of unions as measured by unionization rates as well as the end of estate taxation and less progressive income tax systems is associated with more economic inequality since the 1970s especially combined with lower economic growth rates relative to the return to capital."

You can also get quite a few bits of the book on Google Books if you want a free preview.   The book surveys the evolution of wealth inequality as measured by the Gini Coefficient and the wealth shares of the top 1% and top 10% for Canada, the United States and the United Kingdom.  A quick sample of one of the figures below on the wealth share of the top 1 percent in the United States from 1774 to 2012.

 

Anyway, it has been great working with Palgrave MacMillan and its staff in putting this project together and seeing it through.  Am glad to see the book out.