The Road(s) Ahead

  

The United States under President Trump has taken yet another jab at Canada’s economy with the announcement of new 50 percent tariffs on range of goods.  This is a negotiating tactic, designed to extract leverage in the upcoming negotiations but the move also sends important messages about the ultimate aims of the United States with respect to its relationship with Canada that we ignore at our peril.

If implemented, given that oil, gas, potash, fish and critical minerals are exempted, these tariffs will have little to no effect on Canada's resource sector and exports - which are about 40 percent of our exports to the USA. The duties are actually narrowly targeted at manufactured and consumer goods such as chemicals, plastics, electronics, alcohol, dairy and hockey sticks of all things.  These are actually all together a relatively small portion of our exports to the United States. Auto parts - a crucial part of the integrated supply chain are also exempt – for the time being.

So, the overall impact on the macroeconomy would be relatively small but those specific targeted products would be relatively hard hit.  Alberta and Saskatchewan are the least impacted. Ontario and Quebec are more heavily impacted.  More importantly, these new tariffs are a violation of CUSMA and raise the question as to whether the United States can be relied upon to adhere to any deal even if struck entirely on their terms. Moreover, it is clear that the American version of a new Canada-U.S. trade agreement is not going to be what we are looking for.

The American negotiating vision is for deals with Canada and Mexico that emphasize their roles as input providers to the U.S. economy and value-added chains of production rather than trade partners and on terms always favouring the United States. In the case of Canada, our role in the American input chain is oil and gas (provided to them at a discount), as well as potash, critical minerals and any other resource product they require but that makes room for their producers first, such as lumber. 

Despite the mutual gains from trade, they see our value added manufactured and consumer products as direct competition to American manufacturers given the similarity of the high-wage employment generated.   Despite our ongoing attempts at trade diversification, our current dependency on the United States market for three quarters of our trade reduces our bargaining power. 

In the case of Mexico, the American preference is also mainly for their resource products such as petroleum, minerals, and food and agricultural products but they will tolerate manufactured products such as electronics and medical devices and even auto parts made with cheaper Mexican labour  - that of course stays on their side of the border.  Canadian labour does not provide the American consumer market with cheap manufactured goods and so we are out of luck there.

It is unlikely that CUSMA is going to be renewed in its current form, and any future trade arrangement will see tariffs on Canadian goods that are both negotiated as well as imposed unilaterally on spur of the moment. The Americans seem to want the deal that they last got in 1854 under the Reciprocity Treaty whereby there was free trade in resource products and raw materials but continued tariffs on manufactured products – on both sides one should add. Oddly enough, the Americans ended that deal for an assortment of reasons including lobbying by American resource producers in what was then a more resource intensive United States, American perceptions that Canada benefitted more from the deal than they did (sometimes it seems nothing changes) and Britain’s tolerance for the Confederate side in the Civil War.  Canadian merchants advocated joining the United States if they did not get a trade deal in 1854 but once it ended, Confederation and creation of an east-west economy behind a substantial tariff wall followed.

So, what are our options? Well, one option is simply to throw in the towel and give the Americans everything they want on their terms and hope that ends it and we get on with our lives. Of course, the resulting impact on the Canadian economy would be a return to a more resource intensive economy in terms of our exports and the loss of some employment in value added manufacturing and consumer goods production. Our auto sector would be smaller but after adjustment more competitive as would a lot of other small business manufacturers.  Alberta, Saskatchewan and to a lesser extent the Atlantic region would be relatively unscathed. On the other hand, the remaining provinces would be hit hard.

Of course, that outcome qualitatively does not seem much different from a world where the Americans levy tariffs on all our non-resource exports to the United States and we levy tariffs on all of our non-resource imports from the United States.  Oddly enough, this almost sounds like an updated version of the 1854 Reciprocity Treaty which in the end was abrogated by the Americans because they thought we derived greater benefits from it.  Yet, President Trump does appear to be a 19^th century thinker when it comes to trade and tariffs so maybe this is where we should go. Free trade in natural resource and agricultural products but tariffs of our choice on everything else would as in the 19^th century protect smaller and less efficient Canadian producers – extensive as opposed to intensive economic growth.

The best outcome is one without tariffs and free trade between Canada and the United States and Mexico whose economies have a lot of complementarities and stand to gain substantially from freer trade.  Alas, for that to happen it takes two willing partners to tango, and the Americans currently prefer not a tango or a pas de trois but more of a freestyle solo dance performance.  If the Canadian economy was able to generate income and employment under a tariff regime when it was a small and dispersed market of 8 million people, surely it will survive a tariff trade world when it has a market of 40 million people.  Will we have to get by with less?  Sure. But, as a country, our declining productivity means that we have been getting by with less for a long time now.  If it is any satisfaction, the Americans will also be poorer with tariffs.

 

The Fork in the Road

  

“Two roads diverged in a wood, and I—

I took the one less traveled by,

And that has made all the difference.”

Robert Frost

 

As our glacial spring morphs into summer like weather, we are also approaching a crossroads of sorts, a fork in the road if you wish. Over the last year, Canada’s government has been navigating a somewhat delicate road between its vital economic relationships with a volatile and more aggressive United States and attempts to diversify our trade and security relationships with like minded middle powers.  At some point, most likely this summer, Canada will need to make some decisions that will require commitments. Moreover, despite the attractions of poetry, automatically taking the road less travelled may not necessarily be the best option as it could make a difference not compatible with our best long term economic interests. Yet, the more travelled road comes with its own challenges.

We are poised at the junction of two roads.  First, there is the continuation our North American trade zone as currently embodied in the Canada-US-Mexico (CUSMA) trade arrangement with new emphasis on our trade with Mexico.  This arrangement has been under siege of late with higher tariffs levied on our auto production, steel, aluminum and forest products.  Yet about 90 percent of our exports still flow tariff free into the United States and our economy has been surprisingly resilient over the last year. This economic arrangement is the result of over a half century of North American economic integration and has benefitted Canadian energy producers, manufacturers and business in general.  Despite the pronouncements of President Trump, it has also been of great benefit to the United States in terms of providing a market for its manufacturers, raw materials for its industries, and a secure fossil fuel energy source that is sold to them at a discount of between $10 and $20 a barrel known as the WCS-WTI differential. Indeed, Canada accounts for about half of the crude oil imported by the United States but it then re-exports some of it at the world price yielding a windfall to the US of nearly $20 billion annually.

The other approach is what can best be described as a New National Policy driven by the change and disruption in the US led world economic and security order.  Essentially, in this approach, Canada will pursue trade and export opportunities with Europe and Asia for its goods and resources to build an east-west flow to complement the north south flows of CUSMA.  This will be accompanied by investment in defence production and security arrangements with like-minded partners in Asia and Europe.  In essence, Canada and its Arctic become a Zone of Transit for these east-west global flows.  To some extent, the marathon trade and marketing trips undertaken by the Prime Minister to bring this about have been bearing some fruit.  For example, our investment drought has taken a turn for the better with foreign direct investment in Canada hitting a $93 billion high. However, nearly half of that has come from mergers and acquisitions rather than the financing of new productive activity. While such a successful metric may befit the efforts of an investment banker Prime Minister, it remains that investment in productive capital rather than asset ownership rearrangement is what is needed to improve Canada’s poor real per capita GDP growth performance.

Of course, which road we will take is uncertain.  On the one hand, Canada still relies on the United States for nearly three quarters of its export market and even without CUSMA, the fact is that the United States is a natural trade partner given we share the continent with them and the north south physiography of North America favours trade with the United States.  As well, despite our pronounced flirtation with the EU and even hints of membership, realistically, that will require a level of political and regulatory integration of social and economic policies that will be blocked first and foremost by Canada’s provinces who after 150 years of Confederation have yet to address inter provincial trade barriers.  At best what we are looking at is perhaps an  “Associate EU Membership” that will boost trade, investment and defence but even there the reality remains that all the members of the EU have yet to approve full implementation of the Canada-EU free trade agreement reached in 2017.

Prime Minister Carney is of course aware of these challenges which is why it appears he is hedging his bets.  On the one hand, he travels the globe making deals and dangling the prospect of Canadian military purchases of Korean submarines and Swedish fighter jets while maintaining that Canada must seek non-US trade partners.  On the other, he remains open to deeper integration with the United States in some sectors with the likelihood that current arrangements in energy and auto manufacturing are what he wishes to continue.  Of course, there was a time when some type of deeper common market arrangement with the United States with common external trade policies might have been the next step to deeper North American integration, but the actions and antics of the Trump administration have nixed that path with the Canadian public for the next fifty years. The point worth considering is that despite greater integration and a larger effective market, over the last few decades, our productivity has declined rather than grown with such advantageous access to the US market.

Ultimately, what Prime minister Carney seems to be signalling is that at this fork in the road, Canada will be travelling down both roads at once.  It will pursue greater integration with the United States, if necessary, along the lines of the existing relationships in energy, steel and auto manufacturing but it will likely not expand or create new ones in either those areas or even other areas.  At the same time, Canada will seek to expand trade with Europe and Asia especially with regards to energy and resource developments though even here, to put our money where our mouth is, we will need to build new pipeline and transport capacity.  Moreover, we will need to offer some tangible evidence we are serious about diversifying away from the United States such as buying Swedish fighter jets or Korean or German submarines.  Needless to say, the Americans will likely not take kindly to such impertinence given that their approach to trade with Canada seems to be “what is ours is ours and what is yours is negotiable”. How dare we spurn their wares.

Still, here we are and by summer’s end we are likely to get some answers as to whether or not Prime Minister Carney’s strategy is working. Stay tuned.

 

 

Harris or Trump? For Canada, Post November 4th Is Going to Be a Challenge

 

As we move into the final sprint of the US election, it bears as always to pay attention to the economic implications for Canada.  Whatever one’s political priors or favorites may be in this election, in the end it needs to be realized that when it comes to US trade and economic interests, it does not matter whether Trump or Harris wins– American interests trump (no pun intended) Canadian ones.  And in the case of the economy and our trade relationship with the United States, be prepared for some tough bargaining.  While 2024 marked the 30^th Anniversary of NAFTA, it has since 2020 been replaced by the USMCA or CUSMA agreement with renewal talks beginning in 2026. 

 

Along with perennial sticking points like milk and dairy or softwood lumber, in the United States, despite what economists and evidence might say about economic growth and the benefits of trade in the wake of NAFTA and CUSMA, the debate will be shaped by the widespread belief that NAFTA in particular resulted in job losses and wage stagnation.   In the case of manufacturing, the accompanying graphic summarizes quite nicely why the Americans are going to be playing hardball.  In many respects, US manufacturing job losses did coincide with NAFTA. 

 

Figure 1 presents annual Canadian and American manufacturing employment from 1976 to 2023 using a dual scale since US employment and population in general is about ten times ours.  In 1994, there were nearly 19 million Americans employed in manufacturing and 1.8 million in Canada. In the decade afterwards, by 2005, US manufacturing employment fell to 16.2 million while Canadian manufacturing grew to 2.2 million.  In the wake of NAFTA, American manufacturing employment fell by 14 percent while Canadian manufacturing employment rose by 20 percent. 

 

 

 

 Since 2005, American manufacturing employment has declined slightly to 15.6 million while Canada’s declined to about 1.8 million where it has stabilized somewhat.  In other words, over thirty years, Canada has stayed flat in terms of total manufacturing employment (notwithstanding the rise and fall from 1994 to about 2010) while the US has seen a decline.  The good news is that since about 2019, as evidenced by the 5^th order polynomial smoothing line, both countries have seen a slight increase in manufacturing employment as a result of fallout from the pandemic, trade issues with China and the rise of onshoring production activities.

 

Yet those same polynomial smooths show a pretty consistent decline for the US since 1976 with Canada doing somewhat better.  True, Canada is not to blame for the decline in US manufacturing.  Both countries have seen a decline in manufacturing employment over time both in absolute numbers as well as a share of total employment.  It is not 1960 anymore.  There have been productivity issues in both countries as well as intense competition starting in the 1990s from China and other Asian economies as well as Mexico which is/was a part of CUSMA/NAFTA.  However, that does not matter.  For the United States, creating jobs in manufacturing will mean looking at all the players – including Canada.  It will not matter whether Harris or trump becomes President in this regard.  Notice has been served.