The road ahead for Canada became better delineated this week with the announcement that the winning proposal to build Canada’s new submarine fleet was the German Norwegian TKMS bid which beat out the South Korean Hanwha proposal. While the ultimate deal still must be finalized and Hanwha is the reserve bidder, in the world of defence contracts, being the reserve winner is not much of a consolation prize. In the end, the NATO relationship with Germany and Norway seemed to be the deciding factor even with the many industrial benefits both bids promised. And in terms of regional effects, the TKMS bid will have major economic impacts on Nova Scotia (Halifax) and there are a small number of deals proposed with companies in British Columbia, Mississauga, Montréal and Trois-Rivières.Unfortunately, there will be no steel contract for Algoma in Sault Ste. Marie.
In my earlier thoughts on the plans to evolve Canada’s economy and international relationships, I ventured that Canada had come to a fork in the road: the path of continued integration with the United States versus establishing an east-west trade flow through Canada linking Europe with the Asia Pacific. Canada’s defence policy purchases are part of this economic policy with the fighter jet project offering a choice between Europe and America and the submarine contract offering a choice between Asia-Pacific and Europe. I also ventured that for the time being, Canada was essentially dangling the prospects of both but needed to make some choices. The choices are being made but the process is unfolding very slowly.
In terms of economic and political diversification with Europe and Asia, while Canada will continue to pursue opportunities with the Asia-Pacific, it is with Europe that Canada will increasingly try to link with both economically and with respect to defence and security especially when it comes to the Arctic. In a sense, the Innisian line that the civilization of Canada settlement is essentially the civilization of Europe still holds and we look towards the Atlantic more than the Pacific. Despite this, participating in Eurovision is not quite the same as being a member of the EU. One hopes that despite not acquiring the Hanwha submarines, Canada will still make important defence purchases in South Korea and Japan if it is to be serious about having an east-west global economic vision.
However, going with the TKMS bid also means that the likelihood has grown that Canada will likely not go with the Swedish Gripen jets. In the end, even if we maintain the current volume of trade with the United States and grow trade with all our other partners, the United States will still be our dominant trade partner for decades to come. Given that we share the North American continent with them, we will also need to maintain defence and security arrangements with them which means the 88-plane F-35 purchases is a done deal. It is only a matter of an official announcement. The only question is whether we will go with a dual fleet and order additional planes from Sweden. After all, in the early 1980s, Canada deployed nearly 140 fighter jets and there is room to do both. In the world of federal deficit financing, what's a few more billion dollars?
Continuing the F-35 purchases also has its political dimension. We are going to be hammering out the details of a new trade arrangement with the United States, and it is unlikely we will back out of the jet purchases and risk incurring additional Trumpian wrath. We are also likely to give in on several other fronts including aspects of our supply management, digital services and increased North American content in manufacturing with integrated supply chains (auto production). And we will likely still face tariffs at some base level because that is the current state of U.S. trade policy and our relationship with them is not that special. Not that it ever was really. It has always been America first but previous administrations were more diplomatic regarding our junior status whereas the current one is simply more up front.
Of course, the Americans apparently seem keen on a “Fortress North America” approach but such an approach seems at odds with the east-west trade diversification strategy that we are demonstrating we are pursuing. It also will likely lock us into a relationship where the U.S. will have preferential access to our natural resources limiting our ability to realize their maximum economic potential. While we may think we are negotiating Fortress North America, the other side will interpret it as Fortress America. So, the key question is can we negotiate the best deal possible without locking ourselves into an even tighter economic straitjacket while we wait for growth in non-U.S. trade to gradually reduce our economic dependence of the United States?

